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Abstract: 
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has increasingly been perceived as an 
important actor in multilateral institutions at the global level, both within and beyond 
the United Nations (UN) system.  
Research on this new topic of EU and global multilateral governance has been 
conducted by both legal scholars and political scientists, predominantly from the 
perspective of their respective disciplines. This has resulted in parallel, often 
unrelated research agendas. 
This paper sets out to bridge this interdisciplinary divide by bringing these parallel 
research tracks together to enhance the overall understanding of the EU’s position in 
global multilateral governance. To this end, a genuinely interdisciplinary framework 
of analysis is conceived and tested out on three distinct cases of EU participation in 
the UN system, thus demonstrating the value added, but also the limits, of 
interdisciplinary research on this topic. The paper concludes by mapping out a future 
joint research agenda:  building on a number of cross-cutting research questions, it 
offers some possible pathways of how to conduct the type of interdisciplinary 
research needed to fully understand and explain the EU’s contribution to global 
multilateral governance.  
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1. INTRODUCTION1
 
Since the middle of the 20th century, ‘multilateral governance’ has incrementally 
developed into what for many currently appears to be the (at least desired) default 
mode for the joint identification and solution of the world’s pressing problems.  
For the purpose of this working paper, ‘multilateral governance’ is considered to be a 
mode of conducting global affairs that involves states, and (still only with the express 
permission of the ‘gate-keeping’ states) non-state actors, striving for a collective 
solution of global problems on the basis of rules.2 The functional loci of ‘multilateral 
governance’ are multilateral fora, i.e. institutional set-ups which can reach from 
established international organizations over international regimes to loose ad hoc or 
soft law arrangements. Manifold examples of such multilateral fora exist, which 
include such diverse arrangements as the International Dolphin Conservation 
Programme or the Hague Conference on International Private Law, but also the set 
of bodies that form part of the United Nations (UN) system. As a matter of fact, a 
significant share of activities that could be referred to as multilateral governance is 
conducted under the auspices of the UN. Its complex architecture provides for a 
great many instances of multilateral negotiation processes, which have been chosen 
to serve as the primary source of examples used to illustrate our points in this 
paper.3
The study of processes and structures of these multilateral governance 
arrangements has engaged the disciplines of legal and political science alike.4 Both 
                                                 
1 This paper has been written in the framework of the interdisciplinary research project “The EU and 
Global Multilateral Governance” conducted by the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies. The 
authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable comments of their promoters Professor Jan Wouters, 
Professor Hans Bruyninckx, Professor Stephan Keukeleire and Mr. Tim Corthaut. An earlier version of 
the paper was presented at an UACES conference entitled “The international role of the EU – New 
Patterns of Global Governance”, on 16 June 2007, in Birmingham. The authors would also like to 
thank the participants of this conference for helpful comments.  
2 This functional definition seems to be the most workable as a starting point for interdisciplinary 
research. It is based on definitions commonly found in political science: While ‘multilateralism’ has 
traditionally been defined as the “institutionalized collective action by [a] … set of independent states” 
according to rules that “are publicly known and persist over a substantial period of time” (Keohane 
2006: 1; Ruggie 1992), the more recent notion of ‘(global) governance’ widens the spectrum of 
possible participants in these collective action processes to other public and private actors than states 
and puts the emphasis as much on informal as on formal rules and procedures (Held/McGrew 2002: 8-
9; Rosenau 2000).  
3 While focusing on the UN for practical purposes, we do not intend to ignore multilateral fora outside 
the UN system. On the contrary, the conceptual framework proposed in this paper may also be applied 
to other instances of multilateral governance beyond the UN sphere. 
4 Even though the term ‘multilateral governance’ may not be employed in legal science (yet) - and its 
definition remains contested in political science - we inspire ourselves by the functional political 
science definitions here by virtue of their necessary openness for the planned interdisciplinary 
endeavour. Such a pragmatic approach - especially with regard to terminology - may be a precondition 
for thinking about joint legal-political science research, as the development of basic common 
terminology may constitute too big of an obstacle to start with.  
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have thus also recently been able to discern a new trend relating to an increasing 
presence of other actors than states in multilateral negotiation processes. One, if not 
the most striking example of this latest trend is the European Union (EU). Its 
mounting prominence in many multilateral fora - especially, but not exclusively in the 
UN system - can be attributed to two essential factors: firstly, the EU has repeatedly 
committed itself to “effective multilateralism” as a means to improve global 
governance (European Council 2003; European Commission 2003). Secondly, even 
though the European Community (EC)5 has de jure and de facto been involved in the 
work of global multilateral institutions for decades (Brückner 1990; Pernice 1991), its 
reinforced multilateral activity has only really brought it wider recognition in recent 
years. The EU’s seemingly successful role in the setting up of the International 
Criminal Court and in the ratification process of the Kyoto Protocol are often cited as 
examples in this context (Groenleer/van Schaik 2005; Schubert 2000: 21).  
 
As a fairly recent phenomenon, the EU’s participation in multilateral governance 
raises a number of questions interesting to both legal and political science scholars. 
Since the EU is neither a state, but displays in some policies state-like traits, nor a 
loose regime, although in some issue areas forms of coordination prevail, the first 
question that imposes itself is how such an entity can be accommodated by the 
various multilateral governance fora. Multiple other questions, e.g., on the 
consequences of the EU’s involvement in multilateral governance, follow from this.  
A precondition for answering questions of this type is sound legal and empirical 
research on the EU’s involvement in multilateral governance. Such research is 
considered a promising endeavour in (at least) two respects: 1. It can yield 
interesting insights bound to advance our understanding of the way policy-making at 
the global level currently functions.  2. It can help us understand both the historical 
evolution and the current status quo of the EU as a foreign policy actor.6  
 
However, the relative newness of the phenomenon - a hybrid actor such as the EU 
playing a part in multilateral governance - is also the main obstacle to studying it. No 
firmly established catalogue of tools to analyse the subject area is currently available 
                                                 
5 It has become common to refer to the external activities of the European Community as actions of the 
‘European Union’. In parts of the literature, the terms are sometimes confounded, which may also be 
an expression of the lack of interdisciplinary approaches. In this article, we use the term ‘EU’ 
whenever we mean actions of the Presidency, Member States, and/or the European Commission 
‘acting on behalf of the whole of the Union’, and of the EC where this may be needed to be legally 
accurate.   
6 One can speak of EU foreign policy as “the activity of developing and managing relationships 
between (…) the EU and other international actors, which promotes the domestic values and interests” 
of the EU (Smith 2003: 2) and of European Union foreign policy whenever genuine EU actors 
(Commission, Council) or EU member state actors act explicitly on behalf of the EU.  
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in any of the directly affected disciplines (International Law, International Relations, 
EU law, EU integration studies). On the background of this observation, we find it 
necessary to focus here not so much on what the EU is actually doing in multilateral 
governance processes, but to take one step back and look at how to analyse what 
the EU can do and is actually doing in multilateral governance processes: What are 
suitable ways to study the position of the EU in multilateral governance? The 
intention of this paper is to provide some answers to this question, as we claim that 
there are possible pathways that have not yet been explored in the existing literature 
on the topic. 
 
Interdisciplinary research represents one such promising pathway, which can come 
itself in different ways, and a number of arguments will be presented to explicate why 
it merits more attention than it currently receives. The paper has been structured to 
substantiate this point: Based on a brief review of the currently available literature 
and a critical appreciation of the existing legal and political science approaches 
(2.1.), the paper argues in favour of an alternative, interdisciplinary approach (2.2) 
and subsequently introduces an exploratory interdisciplinary framework of analysis 
(3.) to investigate into the EU’s position in multilateral governance. This analytical 
framework will be tried out on three illustrative examples of EU activity in the UN 
system. The results of this exercise will then be used as the foundation for outlining 
elements of an interdisciplinary research agenda, which may open further pathways 
for future joint legal and political science research (4.). To conclude, our main 
arguments and findings will be summarized and linked to a final plea for more 
collaborative research on the role of regional actors in multilateral governance (5.). 
 
 
2. EXPLORING THE EU’S POSITION IN MULTILATERAL GOVERNANCE: 
CURRENT APPROACHES IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, THEIR LIMITS 
AND THE RATIONALE FOR AN ALTERNATIVE 
 
Starting off with a critical assessment of the currently fairly small, but growing bodies 
of literature on the EU’s activities in multilateral governance (Jørgensen, 2007: 509) 
and of the typical ways of approaching the subject in both legal and political science, 
it will be argued that mono-disciplinary research on this topic displays certain flaws 
that an alternative, interdisciplinary approach could repair. 
 
 5  
2.1. Current approaches to the study of the EU’s position in multilateral 
governance in legal and political science  
 
Based on brief reviews of the respective bodies of literature, this section will contrast 
legal and political science approaches to the topic of the EU’s participation in 
multilateral fora to expose their virtues and limits. 
 
2.1.1. Looking at the EU’s role in multilateral governance through the lens of 
legal science 
 
In legal studies, approaches to studying the EU’s participation in multilateral 
institutions have principally taken two forms. Firstly, a few articles have been written 
from the perspective of International Law only (Sybesma-Knol 1997; Schermers 
1983). The focus of these articles has primarily been on the access of non-traditional 
actors, who do not fulfill the formal criteria of a sovereign state to intergovernmental 
fora and on the consequences of their involvement in international organisations in 
general. The EU has often served as one of several case examples.  
Secondly, most of the literature focusing on the EU’s participation in multilateral 
institutions has started out from a ‘bottom up’ EU Law perspective and then 
integrated the International and EU Law dimensions (Eeckhout 2004; Koutrakos 
2006; Govaere/Capiau/Vermeersch 2004; Lenaerts/de Smijter 1999; Marchisio 
2002). Arguably, the core interest of this category of literature has been on the legal 
status of one of the outcomes of EU multilateral activity, namely ‘mixed agreements’7 
(Rosas 2000). If specific case examples of EU multilateral activity are discussed, 
they are predominantly chosen from the field of trade (Antoniadis 2004).  
The following section will attempt to integrate these two legal approaches to provide 
an overview of what is generally and typically found in academic accounts of EU 
multilateral activity in the UN system exploring both the legal foundations and the 
institutional frameworks.  
 
At the inception of the United Nations, a time when state actors prevailed over non-
state actors in the international fora, the UN Charter only accounted for ‘state’ 
membership (Art. 4(1) UN Charter). In modern times, where there is a plethora of 
actors beyond individual states, questions and concerns arise of how such actors 
can play a role in a system that formally does not allow for their membership. This 
has been an increasing challenge for the European Union. In view of the EU being 
commonly labeled as sui generis (Wallace 1983), its very architectural composition is 
                                                 
7 A mixed agreement is an agreement concluded by the Community and its Member States because 
Community competences alone do not cover the entirety of the agreement. 
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what generates even more constraints than for any other actor not classified as a 
state wishing to participate in international fora. 
 
The wide range of UN platforms such as the United Nations General Assembly, UN 
World Conferences, sessions of UN specialized agencies and treaty bodies set out 
the stage for actors to deliberate a variety of global issue areas. While membership 
to such fora may be limited to individual states8, apart from a few exceptions9, 
participation of non-conventional actors is nevertheless possible through a variety of 
means, such as, UN resolutions granting observer or full participant status, inclusion 
of a Regional Economic Integration Organization (REIO) or more recently a Regional 
Integration Organization (RIO) clause in international conventions, and, albeit rare, 
by making amendments and/or modifications to the desired body’s constitution.  
 
The different statuses currently available in the UN framework have been 
categorized as the following by Hoffmeister and Kuijper (2006): “1) full member; 2) 
full participant; and 3) observer” (cf. table 1). The main underlying differentiating 
factor between full-member status and the other two categories is the right to vote 
and/or block consensus. When an actor is granted full participant status, also 
referred to as an “enhanced observer”,  it is entitled to make amendments and 
proposals, serve as rapporteur, preside over meetings, and be invited to both formal 
and informal meetings without facing major time constrictions when making 
interventions. Actors awarded observer status on the other hand, must cope with the 
most restrictions whereby their presence may even be limited to only formal 
meetings. Furthermore, observers may only intervene after all official members and 
participants have made their interventions. Unlike full participant status, observers 
may not serve as a rapporteur nor can they preside over meetings 
(Hoffmeister/Kuijper 2006).   
 
The inclusion of a REIO10 clause in an international agreement is an additional 
overture, enabling regional economic integration organizations to participate in the 
UN system. A REIO is commonly defined in UN protocols and conventions as “an 
organization constituted by sovereign states of a given region to which its member 
states have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by […] 
convention or its protocols and [which] has been duly authorised, in accordance with 
                                                 
8 In accordance to Article 4 of the UN Charter.  
9 Exceptions include EC accession to the FAO and EU accession to the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission. 
10 Recent development have led the REIO clause to evolve to a RIO (regional integration clause). See 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
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its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to it [the 
instruments concerned].11 Accordingly, REIOs, such as the European Community, 
may participate by way of concluding agreements, which on occasion establishes an 
organizational structure for all parties to the agreement, and thereby creating a 
pathway for future participation.12  
 
Table 1: Overview: EC legal status in UN bodies13  
Full Member Full Participant Observer No Status 
- FAO 
- Codex 
Alimentarius 
Commission 
- Commission on 
Sustainable 
Development 
- United Nations 
Conference on 
Environment 
and 
Development 
(1992) 
- World 
Conference 
Against Racism 
(2001) 
- World Summit 
on Sustainable 
Development 
(2002) 
- World 
Conference on 
Disaster 
Reduction 
(2005) 
- UNEP 
- UNDP 
- UNGA 
- UNHCR 
- ILO 
- UNICEF 
- UNRWA 
- WFP 
- UN-Habitat 
ECOSOC 
- UNCTAD 
- WHO 
- WIPO 
- IAEA 
- UNESCO 
- World 
Conference 
on Human 
Rights 
(1993) 
 
- World 
Bank 
- IMF 
- UNSC 
- ICJ 
 
The European Community and the European Union, not being traditional subjects of 
international law (Govaere/Capiau/Vermeersch 2004), generally find themselves 
constricted to observer status, while on occasion awarded with full participant 
status14 in the United Nations system including the UN General Assembly, 
specialized agencies and its funds and programmes. On 11 October 1974 the EEC 
was formally invited with a standing invitation under GA resolution 3208 (XXIV) to 
participate in the functions of the UNGA in the capacity of an observer, and later in 
                                                 
11 See Articles 3(j) and 36 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; and Articles 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.5, 21 
and 22 of the Kyoto Protocol.  
12 See UNGA Resolution establishing the UN Peacebuilding Commission A/RES/60/180 on 30 
December 2005.  
13 Extracted from Annex Inventory of the European Community Status at UN Bodies and Conferences 
in Wouters/Hoffmeister/Ruys (2006).  
14 The EC has been awarded full participant in a variety of World Conferences such as the World 
Conference Against Racism (Durban, 2001), United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Devcelopment (Rio, 1992), Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing 1995), and many others. 
The EC continues to be a full participant in the Commission on Sustainable Development. 
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1976 the EEC observer mission gained full diplomatic status in New York.15 As UN 
specialized agencies, funds and programmes all tend to follow in the shadow of the 
UNGA in respects to membership, the EC’s membership predominantly remain(ed) 
constant horizontally. It is however important to note from the off-set that “community 
membership of international organizations stands in fairly sharp contrast to its treaty 
making activity” (Eckhout 2004: 200). This is primarily due to the complexities of the 
European Union’s architectural framework, more specifically, the areas and range of 
Community competence parallel to the EU pillar structure.   
 
The European Community, while endowed with legal personality under article 281 
TEC, is limited by its areas of competence in both its internal16 and external 
activities. This paper will only focus on the latter while recognizing the notion of 
implied powers and that common internal rules laid down by the EC makes the EC 
competent in the field of external negotiations, moreover, recognizing that if the EC 
has internal competence to achieve a specific objective, it subsequently has external 
competence for the area in question.17 In its external relations the EC may only 
exercise its powers in matters addressing: development cooperation and economic 
and financial cooperation with third countries (Article 181 TEC); common commercial 
policy (Article 133 TEC); environmental protection (Article 174 TEC); and association 
agreements (Article 310 TEC). The EC also has the capability to conclude 
international agreements that fall under its competence umbrella (Article 300 TEC). It 
should be noted that the EC also has the capability to engage in external dimensions 
that affect internal policies18. When matters of shared competences arise, the EC is 
obliged to closely cooperate with Member States in order to define their position in 
unison.19 Furthermore, in areas of parallel competence, such as development policy, 
the Community and Member States may not exclude one another in the procedural 
process.20 All concluded agreements however must not interfere with the autonomy 
of the Community legal order.21 In the course of EC activity in the UN system, 
                                                 
15 For a historical overview of the EU in the UN see Bruckner (1990). 
16 ECJ Opinion 2/94 on accession by the Community to the ECHR, [1996] ECR I-1759; the court held 
its opinion that there was no legal basis for an accession of the EC to the ECHR.  
17 See ECJ Case 22/70 ERTA [1971] and Opinion 1/76 Agreement on a European fund for 
decommissioning inland waterway vessels.  
18 The European Community ratified the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity on 16 December 
2006. Cultural diversity is enshrined in Article 151 TEC.  
19 ECJ Opinion 1/94 “Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning 
services and the protection of intellectual property - Article 228 (6) of the EC Treaty”, paras 16 -22. 
20ECJ C-248/91 Parliament/Council and Commission, 1993 ECR I- 3685 para 16, see supra note 6.  
21 This being said, it is necessary to highlight Article 103 of the UN charter which states “In the event 
of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter 
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail.” The consequences of this Article for the EU legal order have been recognized 
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including negotiating and concluding agreements, the Commission has the 
responsibility to ensure all appropriate relations with the organs of the UN and its 
specialised agencies are being maintained (Article 300 and 302 TEC).  
 
The Treaty on the European Union on the other hand does not bestow the EU with 
legal personality. When matters under Title V (CFSP) TEU (second and third pillar) 
are being addressed in international fora under Article 24 TEU the Council of the 
European Union, on behalf of the EU can negotiate and conclude agreements with 
one or more states. In such cases the EU is represented by the Presidency (Article 
18(1) TEU). Under the same heading, Member States are obliged to coordinate their 
action and uphold a common position in international organizations (Article 19 TEU).  
 
In the United Nations system it is not uncommon to find fora that address issues 
falling under both EU and EC competence (on some occasions exclusive and non-
exclusive creating another dimension to the complexity) areas, consequently 
external representation becomes a challenge. The ‘Rome’/‘Troika’ formulas are mere 
attempts to remedy this problem enabling the Community to participate in the fora 
without a vote while permitting a representative of the European Commission and/or 
Presidency to act as a spokesperson. Not only does this have internal implications, it 
also affects how the international community perceives the EU/EC on the 
international stage.  
 
Legal approaches to studying the position of the EU in multilateral fora are valuable 
because they allow for a comprehensive understanding of the legal foundations 
enabling the EU to be an actor and the institutional framework in which it can play a 
role. However, they rarely, if at all, explicate upon what the EU is actually doing in 
practice. To fill this void a political lens would be needed.   
 
2.1.2. Looking at the EU’s position in multilateral governance through the 
lens(es) of political science 
 
Political scientists have tried out a variety of approaches to examine and account for 
the EU’s performance on the international scene on the whole, though considerably 
less has been published specifically on its continual stated commitment to 
                                                                                                                                           
and extensively analyzed by the CFI in Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council  [2005] ECR II-3533, paras 231-240. An appeal against this judgment is 
currently pending before the ECJ as Case C-415/05 P Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v. Council [2006] OJ C 48/11. 
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multilateralism in the UN context (European Commission 2003) and its actual 
performance in specifically multilateral fora.  
 
Broadly speaking, they have taken two main avenues to examine the EU’s 
performance in multilateral governance: firstly, some authors have opted for ‘top 
down’ approaches, inspiring themselves either by classical international relations 
theories or the newer field of global governance studies. However, most accounts 
conceptualize and analyse global governance structures at length, while the EU itself 
as a fairly new actor on the global scene receives a lot less attention (Warleigh-Lack 
2007; Andreatta 2005). An exception to this may be seen in the literature on global 
governance and regionalism, where the EU is often chosen as the prime example 
(Thakur/Van Langenhove 2006; Söderbaum/Van Langenhove 2005). 
  
Secondly, and quantitatively much more importantly, within the discipline of EU 
integration studies a plethora of ‘bottom up’ contributions on the EU as a foreign 
policy actor have been produced, making use of the whole range of concepts and 
theoretical approaches developed in EU foreign policy analysis (Carlsnaes 2007). 
Only a small portion of these touch, however, explicitly on the EU’s role in 
multilateral governance. A few of these have been conceptual in nature, mapping out 
the conditions for EU ‘actorness’ on the international scene (Jupille/Caporaso 1998; 
Meunier 2000). Others have analysed the EU’s rhetorical commitment to 
multilateralism (Kacperczyk/Jasiński 2005; Biscop 2004). Some scholars have 
explicitly focused on the empirical record of the EU’s participation in multilateral 
institutions (Smith/Laatikainen 2006; Ortega 2006), concentrating either on clearly 
delimited cases of EU participation in UN bodies such as the Security Council (Hill 
2006) or on specific issues such as biosafety (Rhinhard/Keading 2006). Among the 
case studies chosen, trade and financial institutions (Meunier 2005; Kerremans 
2004) have been as prominent as core Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
issues (Tardy 2006). To a lesser extent, research has been conducted on the EU 
and environmental governance (Vogler 1999), development policy 
(Bretherton/Vogler 2006: 111-136), or human rights governance (Smith 2006). Most 
of the more comprehensive textbooks will contain a chapter on each of these 
(Bretherton/Vogler 2006; Hill/Smith 2005). 
 
A survey of the currently available literature reveals, however, that one research 
approach recurs most frequently in various publications. This type of research has 
been mainly preoccupied with and has come - explicitly and in a quite sophisticated 
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manner (Elgström/Smith 2006) or implicitly (Bretherton/Vogler 2006; Hill/Smith 2005; 
Smith/Laatikainen 2006; Ortega 2005; Ginsberg 2001) - to assessments about the 
EU’s ‘role’ on the international scene.22 According to this literature, and focusing here 
only on the UN, the EU seems to play different roles in different United Nations fora. 
Attributions range from ‘active’ over ‘supportive’ to ‘reactive’ and ‘passive’, or from 
‘leader’ and ‘front-runner’ to ‘laggard’ and ‘outsider’, with many possible gradations in 
between (Sbragia/Damro 1999; Hoffmeister 2007; Laatikainen/Smith 2006: 10), 
suggesting different degrees of influence on outcomes. To name but a few examples 
across the whole range of the UN system, the EU has been attributed an active role 
on some environmental issues (Vogler 2003), where it has, e.g., been said to have 
gone from “laggard to leader” on climate change policies (Sbragia/Damro 1999: 53). 
The same trend towards greater involvement has been observed for other policies 
like its activities on human rights issues in the UN (Smith 2006), such as the set-up 
of the International Criminal Court (Schubert 2000: 21), its participation in global 
public health policy conducted under WHO auspices (Eggers/Hoffmeister 2006) or its 
activities within UNESCO (Cavicchioli 2006). In other cases, the EU has, however, 
been seen as not living up to the expectations created, inter alia, by its financial 
engagement, as in UNEP, a case further discussed below.  
 
While the popularity of attaching a ‘label’ to the EU’s performance in a specific forum 
is seemingly unbowed, the bases on which such valuating statements have been 
made have varied. Many studies that culminate in a statement about the EU’s role 
have, however, made use of an analytical framework that has been expressly 
conceived to evaluate the EU’s capacity to act at the international level. Developed 
by Caporaso and Jupille (1998), who themselves draw on older work on the EU’s 
“international presence” and actorness (Allen/Smith 1990; Sjöstedt 1977), this 
framework comprises four concepts defining EU capacity:  
                                                 
22 Investigations into the EU’s potential role quite often part from or want to test the assumption that 
the EU should be playing a “leadership role” in (some) multilateral negotiations, as the EU itself has 
repeatedly expressed its desire to assume such a role.   
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 1. Recognition, i.e. the formal and informal acceptance of the EU by others.  
2. Authority, i.e. the EU’s legal competence to act externally. 
3. Autonomy, i.e. the EU’s institutional distinctiveness and independence from 
others. 
4. Cohesion, i.e. the degree to which the EU is able to formulate internally 
consistent policy preferences. 
Some scholars have made explicit use of this catalogue of concepts in their research 
(Laatikainen 2004; Groenleer/van Schaik 2005; Kraack 2000), whereas many others 
have chosen concepts similar to the ones presented by the two authors (for 
examples, see the various chapters in Laatikainen/Smith 2006; to a certain extent 
also Meunier 2000), without, however, treating all four categories with the same 
degree of diligence. 
 
Taking Caporaso’s and Jupille’s four criteria as starting points to account for the role 
of the EU in multilateral fora, and going through each of them at a time, it is firstly 
expedient to stress their attempt at integrating legal elements into this framework via 
the concept of authority, which is meant to provide for a complete analysis of the 
competences on which EU foreign policy action is based. In practice, the use of this 
concept has often taken very superficial forms, though (Damro 2006), which can by 
no means compare to the type of in-depth legal analysis presented in the previous 
section.  
The concept of recognition displays a de facto and a de jure dimension. To be 
recognized de facto, the EU would ideally have to be a distinctive, autonomous actor 
(autonomy). This would imply that it was clear to external actors who speaks and 
votes for the EU in a given forum and, at best, even across the whole multilateral 
system. That, however, is by no means the case. No stable patterns seem to exist, 
leading Delreux to sum up, with regard to negotiations in the environmental field: 
“Practice shows that (…) who speaks on behalf of the EU and who represents the 
EU is (…) subject to a large degree of variation” (Delreux 2006: 243). This 
observation can without problems be generalized to other policies.23 Further 
                                                 
23 To cite but a few examples, whereas the negotiations in some areas of shared competence, such as 
on recent conventions like the Tobacco Control Framework Convention or the Cultural Diversity 
Convention (in its final phase) were conducted exclusively by the Commission (Eggers/Hoffmeister 
2006: 162-165; Cavicchioli 2006: 141-153), the Presidency remains the lead negotiator on climate 
change issues (Groenleer/van Schaik: 12). A representation arrangement may also be altered during the 
negotiation process, as was the case for the talks on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in which the 
EU was first represented by the Commission, then by both the Commission and the Presidency and in 
the end again by the Commission only (Rhinhard/Kaeding 2006). Yet another constellation was found 
in the negotiations on ‘International Health Regulations’ under WHO auspices, where a model of 
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concerning de facto ‘recognition’, few examples can be found in the literature that 
show where EU activity is clearly recognized as such and credit is given to the EU 
for its performance. Despite some exceptions (Lucarelli 2007; 
Chaban/Elgström/Holland 2006), a considerable lack of research about ‘how others 
(really) see the EU’ can yet be observed. The few examples where it is known that 
the EU has been de facto recognized for its activity include isolated cases like the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the setting up of the International Criminal Court, or 
the drafting of treaties like the Tobacco Framework Convention (Groenleer/van 
Schaik 2005; Eggers/Hoffmeister 2006). In these instances, the EU has - despite 
internal conflicts - been able to maintain a high degree of coherence on the outside 
and has therefore been recognized as a unitary actor by third states represented in 
the relevant UN fora and/or by civil society.  
Finally, ‘cohesion’, Caporaso’s and Jupille’s fourth category, is seen as a crucial 
condition for effective EU participation in UN fora. Although the concept has been 
quite often evoked, only little comprehensive research (Farrell 2006; Taylor 2006) 
has been conducted on the internal coordination mechanisms within the EU that 
precede its position-taking in various multilateral bodies.  
 
In sum, while these four categories conceptually capture the most important aspects 
of EU multilateral activity, political scientists have - so far - really only done extensive 
empirical research on the autonomy concept. Recognition and cohesion still 
constitute failry large research gaps, whereas the authority concept, which 
necessitates a look ‘across the border’ into legal studies, has not been given much 
attention. The discussion of Caporaso’s and Jupille’s analytical framework - as an 
example of one of the currently preferred ways political science deals with the issue 
of EU participation in multilateral governance - has thus demonstrated that the 
existing literature focuses very much on the EU’s capacity to act in international 
fora.24 Besides the research gaps evoked, this approach exhibits a number of 
shortcomings, which will be discussed in explicit comparison to the legal perspective 
in the following part. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
“case-to-case decision who would speak without prejudice to the legal division of powers” emerged 
(Eggers/Hoffmeister 2006: 166). 
24 The discussion of only this analytical framework obviously can and does not do full justice to all 
accounts that exist in the literature. Our observation that this is one of the most widely used and cited 
approaches, which also has the virtue of being sufficiently open for linkages with legal concepts, may, 
however, account for its capacious usage in this paper.   
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2.1.3. The limits of mono-disciplinary research on the EU and multilateral 
governance  
 
The brief review of the literature on the EU and multilateral governance and the 
presentation of a typical approach of how each discipline treats the subject matter 
reveal a number of intriguing observations. 
Firstly, , this overview gives an idea of how complex the subject under study really is.  
Secondly, it testifies the legitimate desire of most scholars - in the face of this 
complexity - to limit the scope of their research. This, however, results in a significant 
problem: The focus both on a restricted theoretical and methodological perspective 
and on clearly delimited sections of social reality leads to several, at times almost 
unrelated bodies of literature within a single field of study. On the one hand, this is 
sometimes the case within each discipline. As both legal scholars and political 
scientists approach the subject predominantly from within their discipline, they are 
confronted with the same type of problem, i.e. overcoming the traditional dichotomy 
of separating the regional and the global level of analysis. On the legal side, as 
shown, the frontier between International and European Law, while still existent, has 
in many instances already been successfully overcome. In political science, 
however, the challenge of appreciating the “increasing mutual relevance” of 
International Relations and the regional approach of EU integration studies, which 
were “previously connected only by a slim isthmus” (Hill/Smith 2005: 389), has only 
recently been taken up.  
On the other hand, the yet more significant tendency that can be observed is that the 
two disciplines, law and political science, are often kept analytically separate, or, in 
many instances, seem to entirely ignore each other’s existence. Notable exceptions 
to this tendency do exist (Macleod/Hendry/Hyett 1998). The most recent example is 
a book edited by a group of international lawyers on UN-EU relations 
(Wouters/Hoffmeister/Ruys 2006) which contains a series of chapters combining 
legal analysis with insights into political reality, predominantly via the testimonies of 
practitioners.  
This does not foil the overall picture that derives from the literature, though: 
Research on the topic has so far been largely characterized by an absence of multi-
level and interdisciplinary perspectives.  
 
 
Table 2 shows a 2x2 matrix that - taking the two central divides (global vs. regional 
level; legal vs. political science) as a starting point - sums up these findings by 
distinguishing between the four currently dominant dimensions of analysis of the 
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EU’s role in multilateral governance. Few scholars have worked on the interfaces 
between any two of the quadrants - the International/EU law frontier may be an 
exception (Vanhamme 2001) -, or have taken into account aspects that would fall 
into the realm of a different discipline. The borders between the four dimensions 
have therefore remained fairly stable, if not , in some cases, impermeable.   
 
Table 2: The four dimensions of research on the role of the EU in multilateral 
governance   
 Legal studies Political science 
Global level 
I  
International Law 
 
III 
International Relations,  
Global Governance 
Regional (European) 
level 
II  
European Law 
 
IV 
EU Integration Studies/ 
EU foreign policy 
analysis 
 
While the observation expressed with this table may be considered ‘normal’ by 
scholars from each of the engaged disciplines - and rightly so if a plurality of 
perspectives is seen as an asset in itself -, we argue that the tendency to approach 
the subject from so many different standpoints can also be problematic, if these 
standpoints are not somehow set into relation with each other. A brief exercise of 
contrasting the two ‘lenses’, i.e. the mono-disciplinary approaches to the field of 
study, nicely exposes the virtues and limits of this way of thinking.  
The classical way of approaching the subject from a legal perspective, as presented 
in part 2.1.1., focuses predominantly on the interpretation of case law and treaties 
when examining the EU’s participation in multilateral (here: UN) fora. It goes into 
great depth in mapping the formal terms of EU participation in the UN system, but 
treats political reality in a rather anecdotic fashion.25 Using solely legal analytical 
tools thus does not tell us much about, e.g., the ways the EU may informally interact 
with its negotiation partners. The legal status merely sets the foundation to which the 
EU can be an actor, the ‘extra steps’ that are needed to examine what is being done 
in practice have the propensity to be absent in legal literature. This results, however, 
in an incomplete picture of reality - an incompleteness which can ultimately also 
jeopardize the legal interpretation process itself, as the embeddedness of legal rules 
in social contexts calls for a thorough appreciation of these contexts in any (legal) 
interpretative process.  
                                                 
25 It must be acknowledged here that the living law dimension was to an extent purposefully omitted, 
which may not do justice to all legal accounts.  
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In contrast to this, section 2.1.2. has identified the currently most widely used 
political science approaches to the subject of study. These are mostly concerned 
with empirical investigations into political reality with the aim of assessing the EU’s 
actual performance in multilateral governance, and work thus mostly on those 
dimensions that are largely neglected by legal studies. In this type of research, the 
presentation of legal bits and pieces often does not live up to the full juridical 
complexities of the subject under discussion. Furthermore, this type of research 
tends to work with underspecified concepts such as ‘autonomy’ or, most prominently, 
the ‘role’ concept. Taking the latter as an example, it has been demonstrated that 
these role attributions are, firstly, not standardized, and, secondly, often made on 
varying grounds, without sufficient specification and/or testing of the underlying 
criteria. More nuanced, well-founded categories of roles would thus seem useful.26 In 
more general terms, all concepts employed would ideally need to be refined, 
integrated in comprehensive analytical frameworks and then systematically built 
upon. Here political science could learn from legal science rigor: the latter’s greater 
definitional density and often more precise language can be a real value added for 
the former. 
 
Finally, this brief exercise of contrasting the mono-disciplinary approaches has 
shown that it would be desirable to broaden the scope of both legal and political 
science research. Important aspects such as internal coordination or external 
recognition of EU multilateral activity have not received the necessary attention and 
constitute currently genuine research gaps in one or the other or both disciplines. 
Furthermore, the global level itself, which constitutes the external environment for 
EU activity, has seemingly not yet been sufficiently examined with specific regard to 
the connecting factors for EU participation. The EU is not the only actor in these fora, 
and the potential to gain interesting insights by examining the power structures and 
traditional conflict-lines that may exist in some of these may be quite high. This 
would also constitute an important step towards fusing the (EU-centric) bottom up 
perspective more with a top down perspective.  
 
In sum, it has been shown that current practice in both legal and political science 
produces a number of ‘blind spots’ in our field of study. These limits of mono-
disciplinary research could be overcome if the synergies of the various approaches 
presented were exploited to a greater extent. Interdisciplinary approaches and sound 
                                                 
26 First important conceptual work on this topic has only recently been presented (see Elgström/Smith 
2006, especially Aggestam 2006). 
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conceptual frameworks to analyze instances of EU participation in multilateral 
governance can be considered as a possible solution.  
 
2.2. The rationale for an alternative, interdisciplinary approach to 
studying the EU’s role in multilateral governance 
 
On the backdrop of the exposed limits of monodisciplinary studies, this paper has 
been written with the intention of stimulating a debate on more cross-cutting, multi-
level and interdisciplinary research on multilateral governance, with a special focus 
on the EU as a fairly new actor in processes of governance at the global level. 
Starting from the notion that complex phenomena of governance demand to be 
studied via broader, more holistic approaches integrating the strengths and tool-kits 
of various disciplines, we call for a widening of the perspective on the EU’s 
participation in multilateral fora. This implies: trying to integrate top down and bottom 
up approaches; attempting to overcome the interdisciplinary divide to dispose of a 
broader analytical tool-kit; and focussing on some of the under-researched issue 
areas beyond trade/finance and core CFSP business.27
 
The rationale behind our calling for multidimensional approaches is three-fold.  
Firstly, under the current conditions, getting a fairly complete picture of the EU’s 
participation, e.g., in a UN body, demands extensive literature search and the 
puzzling together of, at first sight, unrelated publications from several disciplines. 
This already protracted task is often complicated, or even rendered impossible, by 
the fact that the cases studied in legal and political science have often been 
incommensurable. From a practical viewpoint, interdisciplinary research could help 
to produce more ‘all-in-one’, holistic and therefore relevant accounts of how the EU 
fares in multilateral fora in practice. But working in an interdisciplinary manner is not 
just a question of being ‘more complete’ in grasping the complexity of the issues 
under discussion, a desire that may never be fully satisfied by social sciences. 
Another virtue of interdisciplinary research lies, secondly, in the fact that it yields 
greater synergies. On the role of the EU in multilateral governance, legal scholars 
and political scientists already do seem to share some interests and concerns, but 
often employ different terms to mean the same things, or only differ in small, yet 
important nuances. In this vein, both disciplines really need to overcome their tunnel 
visions and regard each other as complementary. Joint research may thus, from an 
empirical-analytical point of view, lead to richer accounts and yield insights that 
                                                 
27 While priority will be given to the attempt to overcome the interdisciplinary divide in this article, the 
other two aims will en passant also be touched upon. 
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guarantee of politics informed by law” (Slaughter Burley 199 mono-disciplinary 
research might simply oversee.  
Finally, from a more normative perspective, if “law informed by politics is the best 3: 
239), then improving multilateral governance as a method to tackle the world’s 
problems passes by a thorough understanding of all its dimensions. Interdisciplinary 
research can play a decisive role in this regard. 
 
An exploratory account of how to conceive and employ an alternative, 
interdisciplinary framework of analysis will be presented in the next section. 
 
3.AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO EXPLORING THE EU’S POSITION 
IN MULTILATERAL GOVERNANCE  
 
On the backdrop of the discussion of mono-disciplinary research on the EU’s role in 
multilateral fora, this section will introduce elements of an alternative approach that 
deliberately tries to overcome the divides between both the two disciplines and the 
intradisciplinary global/regional gap. The resulting framework of analysis will then be 
tried out on three exemplifying cases of EU participation in the UN system. 
Intentionally exploratory in nature, this exercise shall reveal some of the 
opportunities that such an approach may hold for future research on the topic, also 
by uncovering research gaps in the areas studied.   
 
3.1  Building blocks of an interdisciplinary framework for the analysis of 
the EU’s role in multilateral governance 
 
An interdisciplinary analytical framework for the study of the EU in multilateral 
governance would ideally incorporate the strengths of both the legal and the political 
science perspectives by building on existing approaches and concepts in both 
disciplines, as presented in the previous chapter, and trying to refine and extend 
them. Furthermore, its prime task would lie in the accentuation of the inter-linkages 
between the four different perspectives, which have so far often been treated as 
disparate (see Table 2). An approach that could be classified as “systematic 
eclecticism” - joining concepts across disciplinary borders - will be pursued in this 
section to conceive such a conceptual framework, based on a number of testable 
concepts.  
 
Starting out with the global level, international lawyers have, as shown in the 
previous section, been mostly preoccupied with identifying and analysing the 
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international legal status of the EU in, e.g., the UN, and its membership to 
international organizations (Sack 1995). This is a very useful exercise as the status 
and the way it has been granted define the formal limits of EU participation and also 
yield information about the type of formal recognition that the multilateral body, i.e. 
the other members in this forum, has been willing to endow the Union with. Another 
significant category of legal analysis, namely the interpretation of the rules of 
procedure (tabling, voting, speaking etc.) seems of equal importance, since these 
rules determine the way business is conducted in a multilateral forum. The analysis 
of the rules of procedure is closely linked to the issue of status. If other actors in a 
multilateral forum enjoy a privileged status compared to the EU, disposing, hence, of 
more comprehensive rights under the rules of procedures, this represents obviously 
a competitive advantage for them in practice.  
This consideration constitutes also the linkage point with the disciplines of 
international relations and global governance studies, which are mostly 
interested in the functioning - or the ‘governance mode’ - of multilateral fora. This 
involves an analysis of the procedures mentioned but also of informal processes 
and, ultimately, of power structures. IR scholars would ask questions about 
symmetrical or asymmetrical capacities, access to and participation in multilateral 
governance (Barnett/Duvall 2005; Bahr/Falkner 2005; Koenig-Archibugi 2002; Young 
1999). They are also much interested in the de facto recognition of the EU in these 
fora.  
So, ideally, both the de jure and the de facto dimensions need to be investigated 
into. Finally, and this also links the global and the regional levels, the status the EU 
has been granted under international law is - analytically - connected with the 
concept of role employed by EU integration studies and IR, as discussed in a 
previous section. Since role is commonly understood as the “dynamic aspect of a 
status” (Linton 1936: 114), we can thus also identify a de jure (status) and a de facto 
(role) dimension to the very question of what position the EU occupies within a 
multilateral forum.  
 
In a similar vein, European law and EU integration studies employ complementary 
categories in their analyses of the EU’s participation in multilateral fora. From an EU 
law perspective, categories that define EU involvement in multilateral bodies have 
been mapped along the lines of its treaty-making capacities. Consequently, 
competence represents an important unit of analysis, so do the internal decision-
making rules and any existing rules on who is to conduct multilateral negotiations 
(representation). Furthermore, the aim of these negotiations are frequently analysed 
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in terms of the objectives defined in the Treaties and the conduct of any multilateral 
negotiation will be explained by reference to the legal instruments the Treaties 
provide for. 
EU integration studies, and specifically the sub-discipline of EU foreign policy 
analysis, on the other hand, have regularly been building - explicitly or implicitly - on 
the concepts established by Caporaso and Jupille, as outlined above. Special 
attention has been given to the notion of capacity that the EU possesses to act 
independently. This, in turn, depends crucially on two elements: internal ‘cohesion’, 
which can best be achieved via effective internal coordination - in a broad sense of 
the term, including informal internal negotiation processes between Member States -, 
and coherent external representation. The political scientists’ interest in these 
categories mirror the concerns of legal scholars in internal decision-making and 
representation issues, but are again more oriented towards ‘what is really going on’, 
i.e. the pragmatic solutions that may be found in practice - as a result of internal 
negotiations, which thus also become a crucial unit of analysis - to decide who 
speaks for the EU, for instance. Adding to the categories of objectives and legal 
instruments in legal studies, political science will go beyond the formal competences 
and declared goals to look at various types of strategic objectives28 (Keukeleire 
1998: 21-28) as well as at the range of non-legal foreign policy and external relations 
tools such as informal diplomatic or informational tools (Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 
2008).  
All these categories taken together and related with one another across the frontiers 
of the disciplines constitute a fairly comprehensive framework to analyse the EU’s 
role in multilateral governance. Figure 1 gives an overview of the various categories 
established and visualizes the linkages between them, showing that they often really 
represent the two sides of the same coin.  
 
                                                 
28 The EU may pursue different types of objectives with its multilateral activity. Externally, it may be 
wanting to jointly solve problems on the international level, or to export its values or structures, or 
simply to assert its stance as an actor on the global level. As any foreign policy activity, a participation 
of the EU in multilateral governance may, however, also serve the internal, inter-relational goals of 
some Member States as opposed to others. In this vein, a multilateral activity could reinforce the 
internal policy choices of some Member States to the detriment of others. It may also strengthen the 
identity of the Union as a whole. 
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 Figure 1: An interdisciplinary framework for the analysis of the position of the 
EU in multilateral governance 
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If we regroup the presented categories, a catalogue of four overarching con
each of them with a legal and a political science dimension to it, can be establ
The EU’s position in multilateral governance fora is seen here as a function
legal status and actual role, which, in turn, are dependent on or closely rela
these categories:  
1. Recognition29, i.e. the formal recognition of the EU as institutionalise
the granting of a legal status and its de facto recognition as an actor by
actors such as third countries, civil society representatives or public opin
2. Governance mode, i.e. the complex interrelationships between (stat
non-state) actors with varying capacities in multilateral negotiation settin
well as the formal, as governed by its rules of procedure, and inf
governance processes in a given multilateral body .  
3. Actor (EU) Capacity30, i.e. the legal competence, instruments and 
rules guiding internal coordination and external representation on the ba
which the actor operates and the coordination and represen
arrangements as negotiated internally in preparation of the proceeding
specific multilateral body in practice as well as the conduct of 
proceedings itself. 
                                                 
29 This category has been adopted from Caporaso/Jupille 1998: 214 f. 
30 This category builds on and extends elements of the conceptual framework on EU capacity
internationally developed by Caporaso/Jupille (1998). 
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4. Actor (EU) Objectives, i.e. the treaty and policy objectives forming the 
framework of EU multilateral activity in a multilateral body and the specific 
strategic objectives the EU may have in pursuing multilateral activity in a 
given forum. 
 
The objective is now to try out whether such a pre-theoretical conceptual framework 
is workable in practice and which insights its use may yield. This test-run will be 
carried out by applying the set of categories to three illustrative examples, chosen on 
the basis of the categorization of legal statuses. One example from each category 
(member, participant, observer) has been chosen with the intention of verifying 
whether the determination of a legal status, which plays such a prominent role in the 
legal literature, tells us much about the actual role performance of the EU in a given 
forum. The categories will be highlighted throughout to demonstrate their mutual 
reinforcing nature and the interplay between them. The examples studied will provide 
a number of essential empirical facts, but are mostly designed to help us identify the 
virtues and flaws of the proposed approach, thus uncovering further conceptual 
issues, and to highlight the most evident existing research gaps concerning the 
position of the EU in global multilateral governance fora. 
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 3.2 Testing out the interdisciplinary framework of analysis: three 
illustrative examples 
 
The EC as a member of the Food and Agriculture Organization 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations was founded in 
1945 to lead efforts to fight hunger in both developed and developing countries, 
albeit most of its efforts focus primarily on rural areas in developing nations. The 
FAO’s governing body consists of a Conference, a Council and eight Committees: 
Finance, Commodity, Forestry, Constitutional and Legal, Programme, Fisheries, 
Agriculture and World Food Security. The body’s aim of “helping to build a world 
without hunger” is materialised through four main areas: 1) Putting information with 
in reach- serving as a knowledge network; 2) Sharing Policy expertise; 3) Providing a 
meeting place for nations and 4) Bringing knowledge to the field.31 These activity 
areas are carried out by the organisation’s 3600 staff members and are reviewed 
biennially by the Conference of the organisation which includes 190 member nations 
and one member organization, the European Community. 
 
Between 1962 and 1991 the European Community enjoyed privileges of observer 
status in the FAO including the right to participate and speak in the FAO Conference 
on behalf of the Community and its Member States. The Community however could 
not table any proposals, participate in any policy making activities, participate in any 
technical bodies of the FAO32, and naturally had no voting rights. As the EC had both 
internal and external competences in the activity areas of the FAO, and exclusive 
competence in its commercial policy33 and policies on fisheries conservation34, it was 
ready to take the place of its Member States in the organization. However, in order 
for it to accede to the FAO three main rudiments were needed, 1) possession of 
                                                 
31 For more information on the FAO and its activities please see: 
http://www.fao.org/UNFAO/about/activities_en.html  
32 See article XIV of the FAO Constitution 
33 Article 133 TEC; see Opinion 1/75 E.C.R 1355 pp 1363 – 1364; Opinion 1/94 World Trade 
Organization [1994] ECR I-5267 where the ECJ laid down that the EC pursuant to article 133 has 
exclusive competence to conclude WTO agreements in relation to commercial policies but shared 
competences in regards to GATS and TRIPS; Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871 International Agreement 
on Natural Rubber.  
34 Title II TEC articles 32-37; also see Framework Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the conservation 
and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources (repealing Regulations (EEC) No 3760/92 and 
(EEC) No 101/76); Regulation (EC) No 2369/2002 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements 
regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector (amending Regulation (EC) No 
2792/1999); Regulation (EC) No 2370/2002 establishing an emergency Community measure for 
scrapping fishing vessels. 
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international legal personality35; 2) powers of the EC under Community Law36; and 3) 
requirements of the FAO constitutive document (Frid 1993). The latter is seen as one 
of the most difficult obstacles as there was not only an admissions process for 
additional members37, as opposed to original members, but membership was only 
open to ‘nations’.  
The EC (then EEC) began negotiations in 1990 when the Council sent a letter to the 
FAO requesting them to consider its accession.38 In 1991 modifications were made 
to the FAO constitution enabling ‘regional economic integration organizations’ to 
become members to the organization.39 Accordingly, the Community submitted a 
formal request to be admitted to the FAO as a member and on 26 November 1991, 
following a formal voting procedure40 in the FAO Conference, the European 
Community was admitted as the first REIO in the UN system41 and was awarded full 
membership status. The 79 members who were in favour of the EC joining the FAO 
as a REIO were notably enthusiastic, as seen in Appendix G. Explanation of Votes 
on Resolution 7/91 where Brazil stated “let me stress once again that the Brazilian 
Government firmly supports the admission of the EEC in FAO, in the belief that its 
participation will surely contribute to strengthen FAO activities and initiatives”.42  
The EC’s awarded form of membership entitled them under the principle of 
“alternative exercise of membership rights”43 to membership rights and obligations as 
defined in the FAO Constitution. This form of alternative member status enables both 
its Member States and the REIO, in this case the EC, to exercise their rights on an 
alternate basis which is contingent upon their competence areas with the issues at 
hand.  
In practice the Community or the Member States are expected to inform the FAO 
Conference/meeting who has competence in the specific areas that are to be 
covered in the meeting in addition to who will exercise their voting rights, in respects 
to each agenda item.44 In situations where the Community is competent to cast a 
vote “the sum of the rights and obligations of a REIO and its Member States should 
                                                 
35 ECT Article 281 
36 See ERTA Case 22/70 [1971] ECR 263. 
37 Article II.2 FAO Constitution where it reads: “Additional Members may be admitted to the 
Organization by a vote concurred in by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Conference and 
upon acceptance of this Constitution as in force at the time of admission.” 
38 COM(91)387, 18 October 1991 
39 Conference Resolution 7/91 of 18 November 1991; Article II(4)-(10) FAO Constitution 
40 See supra note 41. 
41 Resolution of 22 November 1991, OJ (16 December 1992) C-326. 
42 Appendix G. Explanation of Votes on Resolution 7/91: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5587E/x5587e0p.htm  
43 Article II.8 FAO Constitution 
44 See OJ 1991 C292/8, 10-12: Proposal for a Council Decision on the accession of the European 
Community to the FAO at the 26th session of the FAO Conference 
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never exceed the total rights or obligations of the Member States thereof” (Frid 1993: 
239). Accordingly, when the Community exercises its right to vote, Member States 
may not, and vice-versa.45 How the Community its Member States execute this in 
practice is absent in academic literature and therefore its de facto activity and mode 
of governance within the FAO conference and its related bodies cannot be further 
elaborated upon here.  
Acquiescent to their awarded formal legal status, the European Community gains de 
facto recognition from other international actors by means of being able to partake 
in the procedures of the FAO Conference. This includes speaking as a unitary actor, 
tabling resolutions on behalf of the Community and its Member States and 
introducing resolutions. Furthering the Community’s de facto recognition is their 
established partnership with the FAO. The EC is the largest single funding source of 
the FAO field programme contributing nearly $40 million per year (10 percent of its 
total expenditures).46 While cooperation between the European Commission and the 
FAO dates back to 1991, significant developments47 this century have furthered their 
relationship into a partnership via creating synergies between both EC and FAO 
programmes. This may be seen in collaborative development efforts in Africa, falling 
under the auspices of the EC-FAO strategic partnership objective of alleviating rural 
poverty and hunger, as defined in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In 
September 2004 a strategic partnership was signed between the EC48 and FAO in 
efforts to meet the MDGs. The partnership between the EC and FAO has and 
continues to increase EU presence and recognition globally through their joint 
programme of work in the food security programme, in their restoration of livelihoods 
after the tsunami, their national forest programme facility, and their joint programme 
on pest management. The latter has even made the EU more visible in Asian rural 
areas (Pedersen 2006). Their visibility and recognition by the international 
community, notably in the FAO framework, only continues to increase as not only 
does the EC have the competence to participate in such programmes of work but 
also has the capacity to do so. This as a result maintains to strengthen their role in 
the organization. Detailed empirical research on how others see the EU and its 
activities within the FAO is, however, strikingly absent in the existing body of 
literature.  
 
                                                 
45 Article 9(2) FAO Constitution 
46 Ibid. 
47 For example the signing of the Financial and Administrative Agreement between the EC and UN in 
2003 and the adoption of the Commission Communication on the EU in the UN: Making 
Multilateralism work, also in 2003. 
48 On the basis of Article 302 TEC. 
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The European Community’s internal and external competence in FAO activities, 
notably their exclusive competence in the commercial and fisheries sector, entitles 
the Community to represent its interests and objectives falling within its competence 
level. As such, when it comes time for the Community to be represented and speak 
in the Conference it is the European Commission who is to do so.49 In matters where 
the Community does not hold exclusive competence the EU Presidency is to speak 
on behalf of all 27 Member States.50 In line with the FAO’s four main activity areas 
and mandate the EC’s treaty objectives outlined in Article 33 TEC in addition to its 
policies in rural development51 and food safety52 come hand in hand. Moreover, the 
EU-FAO strategic partnership furthers the Community’s strategic objective of 
meeting the MDGs, which ultimately helps it to sharpen its own profile as a foreign 
policy actor and gain credibility externally and vis-à-vis its own population.  
 
Against this background, it is imperative for the EC and its Member States to 
transparently communicate with one another to ensure a cohesive front is 
maintained and so that its objectives and interests are promoted in an effective 
manner (internal coordination and representation). Political science literature 
does not explore the nature of the Community’s activity in the FAO specifically in 
regards to how the EC coordinates its efforts with its Member States and the process 
taken to decide upon who will speak and what statement will be made. In contrast, 
legal scholars (Dahswood/Hillon 2000; Bello/Rudolf 1997; Frid 1993) have 
extensively explored the framework in which the EC and Member States are obliged 
to cooperate and communicate in preparation to their participation in FAO meetings.  
 
On 19 December 1991 an “Arrangement”53 was made between the Council of the 
European Union and the Commission regarding “preparation for FAO meetings, 
statements and voting”.54  Pursuant to this Agreement the Commission is required to 
inform all Member States of its proposals and statements prior to EC coordination 
meetings. The competent working group of the Council of the European Union holds 
coordination meetings in Brussels and/or Rome to discuss the agenda items of 
upcoming meetings in addition to who will vote and speak55 on the given agenda 
items. The Arrangement also provides guidelines for voting and interventions 
                                                 
49 Article 300 TEC 
50 http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_3754_en.htm#p2    
51 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/fact/rurdev2007/en_2007.pdf  
52 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_031/l_03120020201en00010024.pdf  
53 The arrangement is not officially published.  
54 See Case C-25/94 Grounds 5 for reference.  
55 In accordance with 2.4 of the Arrangement the non voting party may also participate in the 
discussion. 
 27  
(Section 2.1-2.4). Section 2.1 explores Community competence and its right to vote; 
Section 2.2 deals with national competence and the voting and speaking rights of 
Member States; and Section 2.3 addresses matters dealing with areas of national 
and Community competence (mixed competence) and the aim to achieve a common 
position.56 In cases where disagreements arise in FAO matters between the 
Commission and Member States, Section 1.1.2 of the Arrangement endows the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives in the European Union (COREPER)57 to 
decide on questions regarding competences and speaking and voting rights. While 
the stipulations in the arrangement may appear to be clear-cut, various complexities 
arise in practice when trying to decide upon voting rights. This may be observed in 
the EC judgment Case C-25/94 Commission v. Council.58 The division of powers 
consequently remains controversial endowing only theoretical value to XLI of the 
General Rules of the FAO.59 The relevance of this, more specifically of whether the 
Community or Member States have competence, to third parties is arguably limited 
(Frid 1993: 251). It may be assumed that although most non-EC member nations60 to 
the FAO may be unaware and/or oblivious of the architectural complexities regarding 
the nature of alternative membership rights, the main underlying concern is not who 
has the competence to speak/vote but which platform the EC is taking regarding 
specific issues on the agenda. This is primarily because external actors will want to 
liaise and cooperate, to serve their own interests, with both Commission 
representatives61, representing the Community and its individual Member States, 
representing themselves individually or by the EU Presidency.62 Naturally, the 
interchangeability of the EU Presidency versus its own membership rights as a 
member ‘nation’ to the FAO creates confusion to those unfamiliar with the EU legal 
and political framework. This consequently affects how the Community and its 
Member States are being recognized by the international community. To the authors’ 
                                                 
56 See J. Hippler Bello and B. Rudolf, Commission v Council AJIL, vol.91, No.2 (April 1997), pp. 
349-355 and see Commission v Council and Judgement C25/94 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, 
Oct. 26, 1995.   
57 See Aricle 207 ECT for  the legal basis of COREPER 
58 Case C-25/94, Commission v Council (1996) ECR I-1469- The dispute was over who between the 
Community and Member States had the right to vote in the FAO conference pursuant to section 2.3 of 
the Arrangement. For case notes see: Bernaerts, Inge: Nederlandse staatscourant 1996 nº 93 p. 4 ; 
Simon, Denys: Europe 1996 Mai Comm. nº 177 pp.7-8 + nº 219 pp. 23-24; Hermle, Stefan: European 
Food Law Review 1996 pp.276-277; Burrows, Noreen: European Law Review 1997 pp. 64-67 ; 
Timmermans, C.W.A.: S.E.W.; Sociaal-economische wetgeving 1997 pp. 244-245; Gautier, Yves: 
Journal du droit international 1997 pp. 512-516; Adam, Roberto: Il Diritto dell'Unione Europea 1997 
pp.165-182.  
59 XLI of the General Rules of the FAO demand a clarification of division of powers relating to all 
subjects under discussion.  
60 The term ‘nations’ is used instead of states as seen in the FAO Constitution.  
61 See articles 300 and 302 of TEC. 
62 See Division of Competence between the EC and Member States in FAO: http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_3754_en.htm#p2  
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best knowledge, no empirical studies on the issue of the EC’s external 
representation and its interaction with other FAO members are currently available.  
 
While the EC may enjoy full membership rights as a REIO in the FAO Conference, 
limitations do arise; as the European Community may not participate in the different 
FAO Conference Commissions, in any of its committees including the Programme, 
Finance and Constitutional and Legal committees (Pedersen 2006), nor can the EC 
apply their rights in matters of organizational questions or budgetary affairs. 
Additionally, they cannot vote on elective posts in the bodies just mentioned or fulfill 
any functions in any of the FAO organs.63 It is important to note that the EC is not 
required to contribute to the FAO budget however does pay a lump sum to cover 
administrative costs arising from their participation (Pedersen 2006) and also, as 
seen above, significantly contributes to FAO field projects. Furthermore, the EC may 
not participate in the FAO Council (albeit in customary practice the EC is seen as 
having ‘seat no. 50’ as there are 49 elected members of the Council) (Frid 1993: 
254). The Community’s presence and acknowledgment as the 50th member in the 
FAO Council illustrates their de facto practice in restrictive bodies while not 
technically having the legal ‘backing’ to participate. As there is no literature surveying 
such activity, questions on how the EU actually fares in the various FAO bodies 
arise.  
 
In sum, in examining the Community’s capacity to act in the FAO64, by virtue of the 
EC’s formal legal status, it has become clear that their full membership status and 
legal personality provide also the de facto recognition needed to be a distinctive and 
independent actor in the FAO Conference. As such, the EC is recognized by other 
FAO members as a single entity through its interventions, partnership programmes 
and accessions to agreements in context. However, it is important to bear in mind 
that while the Community may be recognized as a single actor, it must share its 
membership rights with its Member States; this of course is dependent upon its 
competence areas, as seen in the alternative exercise of membership rights. The 
competences which the EC possesses to act externally in FAO matters are provided 
for at both the European and international level; at the European level activity is 
granted through its treaties, treaty objectives and case law; and at the international 
level participation is established through the FAO constitutional amendment 
admitting REIO’s in the organization in addition to the formal voting procedure that 
took place in the Conference enabling the EC to become a full member.  
                                                 
63 See FAO General Rules of the Organization rules XLII - XLV 
64 Using the criteria seen in section 4.1.  
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 Furthermore, EU activity and their role in the FAO have received less attention in 
literature compared to that of legal foundations of EU membership to the 
organization. It can be deduced that this is primarily due to the FAO being a very 
unique case for legal scholars studying EU in multilateral governance arrangements 
as it gained full membership status via amendments to the founding Constitution. 
With limited research conducted in the empirical social sciences elements such as 
EU internal and external coordination, in practice, were not explored to its full extent. 
As such, legal and political parallels, in the context of elements needed to participate 
in the FAO, were presented to illustrate the connectivity between the concepts used 
in political science literature to explain what otherwise would be observed in pure 
legal sciences through an explanation of legal clauses and case law. The EU being 
granted full membership status would lead to the assumption that the EU not only 
has the capability but the means to play a prominent role. This assumption has, 
however, not been substantiated, and more empirical research is required to make 
any far-reaching claims on the EU’s role and position in the FAO.  
 
The EC as a full participant in the World Summit on Sustainable Development  
 
The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD, Rio+10) in Johannesburg 
from 26 August to 6 September 2002 aimed to review the progress of the 
implementation of Agenda 2165, and the Commission on Sustainable Development 
was to serve as the organizing and coordinating body of the Summit.66 The Summit 
brought together over 21,000 participants including NGOs, civil society, academia, 
scientists, the private sector and 191 national governments. There were two main 
outcome documents: The Plan of Implementation67 and the Johannesburg 
Declaration on Sustainable Development68 in addition to a few hundred non-
negotiated partnership initiatives, all aiming to further implement Agenda 21.69 
Contrary to the President of the United States, all EU heads of state were present as 
well as representatives of the European Commission.  
                                                 
65 “Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by 
organizations of the United Nations System, Governments, and Major Groups in every area in which 
human impacts on the environment. It was adopted by more than 178 Governments at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 
14 June 1992.”  
See: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/index.htm  
66 Agreed upon by UNGA Resolution 55/199 adopted on 20 December 2000.  
67 http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf  
68 http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POI_PD.htm  
69 For more information on the summit see www.iisd.ca  
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The EU’s commitment to sustainable development70 may be seen through its 
Sustainable Development Strategy71 built upon the 2001 Gothenburg Strategy72, 
making sustainable development at the core of EU policy.73 The two strategies 
individually represent the internal and external dimension of sustainable 
development and as such the EU reaffirms its need to fully implement its internal 
dimension in order to tackle environmental issues at the global level. 
Against this background the EU was dedicated to be a salient actor while making the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development a success.74 Its strategic objectives for 
the Summit were two-fold: strengthening the Union’s international identity (Manners 
2002) but also ensuring that its economic competitiveness was to stay intact. The 
WSSD was therefore of great importance in a variety of ways. 
The European Community was awarded full participant status in the WSSD.75 The 
modalities and formulations of the extent to which the Community could enjoy their 
status was elucidated in the conference’s rules of procedure.76At the general level, 
the delegation of the Community was to be composed of a head of delegation and 
other representatives including alternative representatives and advisers as required, 
whereby the credentials were to be issued by the President of the European 
Commission.77  Regarding speaking rights in the Summit, the President of the 
WSSD, Thabo Mbeki, held the power to accord a right of reply to a representative of 
the EC following its request.78 There are however precincts to when the Community 
could make an intervention, the number of times they could intervene and for how 
long. Like other full participants the Community was formally allowed to make two 
statements at a given meeting. In the Main Committee of the Summit the European 
Community was entitled to be represented by one representative.79 The main 
drawback of course was that the Community did not have the right to vote.80  
                                                 
70 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/; For the purpose of this section the term sustainable 
development, which remains contested in the political science literature (See Carter 2001) holds the 
following definition: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” (World Commission 
on Environment and Development (the ‘Brundtland Commission’, p. 43, 1987) 
71 European Council 10117/06: Review of EU SDS:  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st10/st10117.en06.pdf  
72 http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001_0264en01.pdf  
73 http://ec.europa.eu/research/environment/policy/article_1434_en.htm  
74 European Council Conclusions 17.06.02. 
75 See A/CONF.199/INF/2 and E/CN.17/2001/PC/24 Corr.1. 
76 A/CONF.199/2/Corr.1: 
http://daccessods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/CONF.199/2/CORR.1&Lang=E  
77 Ibid., rules 1 and 3. 
78 Ibid., rule 24. 
79 Ibid., rule 47. 
80 Ibid., rule 62. 
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‘Sustainable Development’ is very much embedded into the European Union’s 
objectives both within its treaty objectives and within its policy objectives. It is 
also reflected in the ‘Cardiff Process’81 which is designed to integrate environmental 
policy by incorporating it into all Community policies. In its treaty objectives this may 
be observed in Preamble Recital, no.8 and Article 2 of the Treaty of the European 
Union where it stipulates “The Union shall set itself the following objectives: to 
promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and to 
achieve balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of 
an area without internal frontiers […].” 
The Treaty on the European Community also makes reference to the term 
sustainable development in Article 6: “Environmental protection requirements must 
be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community policies and 
activities referred to in Article 3, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable 
development.” 
In compliance with international legal principles on sustainable development82 the 
European Union adopted the ‘precautionary principle’83 through its founding treaties. 
This has been confirmed via its application in the European Court of Justice (ECJ)84. 
The EU Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive85 adopted in 2001 is also 
based upon this principle and as such places a legal precedence on sustainable 
development as a whole. 
As early as February 2001 the EU outlined their WSSD policy objectives in a 
Communication entitled “10 Years after Rio: Preparation for the World Summit for 
Sustainable Development”86 which contained four main objectives: “1. Greater global 
equity and an effective partnership for sustainable development; 2. Stronger 
integration and coherence of environment and development on an international level; 
3. A clear agreement on environment and development goals to revive and enhance 
                                                 
81 See: Cardiff (June 1998) [COM(1998) 333 - Not published in the Official Journal] and  "Integrating 
environmental considerations into other policy areas - a stocktaking of the Cardiff process" 
[COM(2004) 394 - OJ C 49 of 28 February 2006] 
82 ‘Precautionary Approach’ can be found and seen in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development.  
83 See: Communication from the Commission of 2 February 2000 on the precautionary principle 
[COM(2000) 1 final - Not published in the Official Journal] 
84 See ECJ  2004. Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 7 September 2004, Case C-127/02 para 
44, Judgment of the Court of 21 March 2000, Case C-6/99 21.3.2000, ECJ reports 2000 Page I-01651, 
ECJ Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 15 June 2000. Joined Cases C-418/97 and 419/97 
85 See OJ L197 of 21 July 2001, page 30 and for further information at the UN level see: 
http://www.unece.org/env/eia/sea_protocol.htm  
86 COM(2001)53 final- 06.2.2001: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0053en01.pdf  
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the Rio 1992 process; 4.Effective measures on a national level with strict 
international supervision.”  
 
Also at the policy level, the EU’s Sustainable Development Strategy entitled “A 
sustainable Europe for a better world: A European Union strategy for sustainable 
development”87 outlined its commitment to the cause. Notably, the EU recognized 
that “Sustainable development requires global solutions. The Union will seek to 
make sustainable development an objective in bilateral development cooperation 
and in all international organisations and specialised agencies.”88 In view of that, the 
WSSD was the perfect occasion where the EU could forward their objectives and 
commitments internationally. The European Union participated in all of the Summit’s 
Preparatory Committee meetings and would at each session reinstate their 
willingness to take a leadership role.89  The international community recognized 
their strengths and potential even prior to the Summit where, to cite only one 
example from civil society, Daniel Mittler, Earth Summit Coordinator for Friends of 
the Earth stated:  “This summit can only deliver meaningful results if the European 
Union shows true leadership”.90  
In order for the EU to present itself as their desired role of being a leader, a lot of 
internal coordination was required. This however was seemingly not an easy task 
given that sustainable development covers three main pillars: ‘economic, social and 
environment’.91 While the European Community may have exclusive competences 
in trade areas, which would fall under the economic pillar of the conference, it has 
shared competences with its 27 Member States in the environment pillar which 
naturally was a fundamental pillar of the conference. As such, the WSSD outcome 
document would be categorized as a “mixed agreement” and accordingly, like many 
other international environment agreements, would have to be signed by both the 
European Union and its Member States.92  
Furthermore, because sustainable development covers such a broad range of 
subject areas, many DGs would have to be involved such as DG Trade, DG AGRI, 
DG DEV and DG ENV, in addition to the necessary Council Working Groups and all 
EU Member States, in each step of the coordination processes, which naturally 
                                                 
87 Communication from the Commission (COM(2001) 264 final). 
88 See Presidency Conclusions Gothenburg European Council 15 and 16 June 2001 paragraph 26. 
89 See COM(2001)53 final- 06.2.2001:  
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0053en01.pdf
90 Similar sentiments were also expressed by the World Development Movement (2002).  
91 See The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, 4 September 2002. 
92 See 1979 Berne Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (OJ 
1982 L 38), the 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 
(OJ 1982 L 210), the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity (OJ 1993 L 309) and the 
1994 Paris Convention on Combating Desertification (OJ 1998 L 83, p. 1). 
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merely added to the intricacies involved in achieving a strong united front. 
Preparation meetings for the Summit did take place93 where even the European 
Parliament was involved throughout the process prior, during and after the WSSD. 
The MEPs that composed part of the delegation were kept regularly informed of 
negotiations, and debriefing meetings where held on a daily basis by senior 
Commission officials.94
In its representation procedures in the Summit, the Community was to be 
represented by the Commission (Article 302 TEC) in trade (Article 133 TEC) and 
agriculture (Title II EC Treaty) related matters, and for all other matters, the Member 
States in tandem with the Commission would represent themselves individually95 or 
by the Council Presidency.96 The diversity of subject areas addressed at the Summit 
in addition to the complexities involved regarding competences, coherence and 
representation, would assumingly not generate a setting where the Community could 
easily be recognized as a unitary actor. Commissioner Wallström on the other hand 
stated in her conclusions of the WSSD: “The European Commission spoke with one 
strong voice in Johannesburg. As the Commissioner for environment, I shared with 
Poul Nielson (Commissioner for Development) the responsibility as chef de file in the 
preparations for Johannesburg. Depending on availability and schedules we 
participated ourselves in the high-level negotiation sessions at ministerial level at the 
WSSD Summit. Co-ordination was further enhanced by the presence in 
Johannesburg of the President of the Commission.” 97 This was naturally contested.98  
In conclusion, the EU’s leadership role - and/or lack thereof - in the international 
environment fora has been explored by various political scientists such as Vogler 
and Bretherton (1999), and more specifically in the WSSD by Lightfoot and Burchell 
(2005) who argue that the EU’s role in the Summit “should be viewed as more of a 
shaping process for the EU as a sustainability leader, rather than a fully developed 
normative power” (Lightfoot/Burchell 2005: 92). There however has been very limited 
research, if any, conducted by legal scholars examining the EU and the Summit99 in 
contrast to existing literature on the legal aspects of sustainable development and 
the EU (Unnerstall 2005, Dhondt 2003) and the EU and environmental law 
                                                 
93 See:  http://ec.europa.eu/environment/wssd/documents/gac.pdf  
94 See: http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_1630_en.htm  
95 Bearing in mind Article 10 TEC. 
96 More specifically, in cases where common positions were presented. 
97 See Wallström, Speech on WSSD Outcome: http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_1631_en.htm  
98 See Monica Frassoni MEP’s statement in Lightfoot and Burchell (2005: 83). 
99 Morgera and Marin Duran (2006) make references to the EU in WSSD however primarily focuses 
on the 2005 UN Summit.  
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(Hedemann-Robinson 2006) in general. The literature in legal studies predominantly 
focuses on the complexities of mixed agreements and shared competences in the 
environmental sphere, while political scientists place an emphasis on the role of the 
EU and their “mixed achievements” (Vogler 2005: 845).  
Through looking at the EU’s formal legal status of full participant in the WSSD and its 
treaty objectives and case law - in relation to sustainable development - we were 
able to discern the formal guidelines versus -and/or- how it complemented their de 
facto activity. The EU, despite its limitations under its status, managed to play an 
active role in the Summit providing it with significant international recognition, notably 
by civil society.  
The EC as an observer in the United Nations Environment Programme  
 
 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was established in 1972 to 
serve as the “voice” for the environment within the UN system. The organization 
aims to facilitate and promote good environmental governance worldwide. UNEP 
focuses on five main areas: 1) Assessing global, regional and national environmental 
conditions and trends; 2) Developing international and national environmental 
instruments; 3) Strengthening institutions for the wise management of the 
environment; 4) Facilitating the transfer of knowledge and technology for sustainable 
development; and 5) Encouraging new partnerships and mind-sets within civil 
society and the private sector. To achieve their goals in these areas UNEP works 
with various other organizations within and outside the UN system in addition to 
NGOs, the private sector, national governments and civil society. The organization 
fittingly  functions using a cross-sector approach. UNEP’s main body is the 
Governing Council100, which consists of 58 members101 that are elected by the 
UNGA for a term of four years. Currently there are twelve EU Member States 
composing the Council. Annually a Global Ministerial Environment Forum102 takes 
place in order to review the issues at hand in global environmental affairs. As the 
Council has limited membership, debates have been ongoing regarding establishing 
                                                 
100 Established in accordance with UNGA resolution 2997 (XXVII)Institutional and financial 
arrangements for international environmental co-operation of 15 December 1972. 
101 Equitable regional representation is taken into account.  
102 Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/242 (Report of the Secretary-General on environment 
and human settlements) of 28 July 1999.  
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universal membership in UNEP. The EU has been actively engaged in such debates 
both internally and externally.103  
 
Currently, the EU holds observer status in UNEP albeit its strong physical and 
financial presence in the organization.104 Its activities and participation are guided by 
UNEP’s founding resolution 2997 Section IV, Para 5 where it invites 
intergovernmental organizations having an interest in the field of environment to lend 
their full support and collaboration. The EC delegation in Nairobi (UNEP’s 
headquarters) is responsible for maintaining its relations with UNEP where the head 
of delegation is accredited to the organization as the EC permanent 
representative.105 Efforts in maintaining a relationship with UNEP are not only one-
sided, in reverse, UNEP also wishes to maintain a strong link with the EU and 
accordingly set up a liaison office in Brussels aiming to promote and facilitate the 
development of joint EU-UNEP collaboration, programmes and projects.106 UNEP 
also appointed an official representative to serve as a focal point between the two 
institutions.107 Further, in September 2004 EU Environment Commissioner Margot 
Wallström and the Executive Director of UNEP, Klaus Töpfer, signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding108 (MOU) reinforcing policy dialogue and collaboration at all levels 
between UNEP and the EU. At the signing of the MOU the Commission and UNEP 
publicly stated and reinforced how both institutions share common objectives, 
mandates, goals and environmental policy priorities.109  
 
The EU’s treaty objectives specifically in relation to its policies on the environment 
are outlined inter alia in Article 2 TEU, and referenced in Articles 6 TEC, 95 para 3 
TEC and 174 TEC which stipulates: “Community policy on the environment shall 
contribute to the pursuit of the following objectives: preserving, protecting and 
improving the quality of the environment, protecting human health, prudent and 
rational utilisation of natural resources,  promoting measures at international level to 
deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems.” 
                                                 
103 See Irish Presidency Speaking Points on International Environmental Governance, 8th Special 
Session of the Governing Council of UNEP, 29 – 31 March, 2004 and Chairman’s Summary: Round 
Table UNEP- Establishing Universal Membership 2-3 February 2004 Potsdam.  
104 Collectively EU member states are the largest donor to UNEP’s Environmental Fund (Maillet 
2006). 
105 http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_456_en.htm  
106 For further aims and objectives see: 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=43&ArticleID=3438  
107 See OJ C 248, 16.9.1983, pp.2-4. 
108 See: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/pdf/com_unep_mou_final.pdf  
109 See IP/04/1115: Global efforts for the environment: Commission and UNEP to reinforce 
cooperation, Brussels, 20 September 2004.  
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At the policy level the European Union also has strong environmental objectives, 
notably in sustainable development as seen in the last section, but also in a wide 
range of policy areas covering fields from biotechnology to climate change. In its 6th 
Environment Action Programme110 (EAP) (2002-2012) four priority areas for action 
were identified: 1) Climate Change; 2) Nature and biodiversity; 3) Environment and 
Health and Quality of Life; and 4) Natural Resources and Waste.  
 
The EU’s underlying strategic objectives for cooperation with UNEP are to further 
EU credibility in its implementation of the commitments made at the 2002 WSSD in 
addition to achieving all environment-related UN Millennium development goals, 
which as a result would contribute to the EU’s ‘front-runner’ approach and 
exportation of EU ‘greening’ initiatives in the international environmental fora. As 
such, the EU has been known to go “forum shopping” (Kellow/Zito 2002), i.e. - given 
the regulatory linkage between the environmental policies of both international 
organizations and the EU - exploring and participating in the arena which most 
favours their specific policy position. Thus, within such arenas, the EU may receive 
the opportunity to shape the agenda to further their objectives. 
 
The European Union’s legal competence in international environmental affairs has 
undoubtedly generated confusion to non-EU states regarding who the primary actor 
is. As the EU shares its competence with its Member States in areas addressing the 
environmental sector, issues surrounding signing, negotiating, ratifying and 
implementation procedures of international environmental agreements arise as non-
EU members do not always know who to approach and/or cooperate within the 
international fora. Nonetheless, under Title XIX of the EC Treaty and its acquired 
legal competence to act externally in matters that may affect internal legislation111 - 
such as the environment - the EU alongside its Member States can and has become 
a party to a variety of international environmental agreements (mixed 
agreements).112 It should however be highlighted that the EU in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity (Article 5 TEC) can only tackle environmental issues when it 
can deal with them more ‘efficiently’ than national governments. 
 
Internal coordination on environmental affairs has seemingly not been an easy 
task as many difficulties seem to arise: at times individual Member States prefer to 
                                                 
110 See Decision No 1600/2002/EC, OJ L 242 of 10/9/2002. 
111 See ECJ Case 22/70 ERTA [1971] and Opinion 1/76 Agreement on a European fund for 
decommissioning inland waterway vessels.  
112 See 1992 Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity (OJ 1993 L 309, p. 1) and the 1994 
Paris Convention on Combating Desertification (OJ 1998 L 83, p. 1). 
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act unilaterally in UNEP initiated environmental negotiations, such as the 
strengthening of the Basel Convention, where Denmark chose not to negotiate 
through the Greek Presidency  and as a result undermined  the EU’s position 
(Kellow/Zito 2002). The various levels and structures of internal coordination in 
preparation for UNEP meetings is not explored in legal or political science literature 
and therefore remains a research gap in analysis.  
 
At the external level, coalition building may be observed  where ‘like-minded’ actors 
tend to make an alliance to further promote and achieve common environmental 
aims. This may be seen in existing coalitions such as the EU-Nordic Council coalition 
and the EU-JUSCANZ coalition (Jahnke 1999).113 The extent to which these 
coalitions are played out in practice in UNEP however are not known as empirical 
research also lacks in this aspect. Further at the external level, the EU and its 
Member States have developed a de facto system of dual representation where 
both the Commission and the Presidency (on behalf of all 27 Member States) 
represent their interests as a whole in UN environmental negotiations including those 
under the auspices of UNEP. There is an implicit alternating procedure where in 
matters of exclusive competence the Commission will speak, and on matters of 
shared competence the Presidency will take the floor (Damro 2006). “The practical 
results of this can be interesting. For the interlocutors of the EU at international 
meetings it can sometimes lead to a bewildering state of affairs where representation 
of the Union can pass backwards and forwards between the Presidency and the 
Commission […]” (Vogler 2005: 839). The acceptance and understanding of non-EU 
member states regarding the Community’s “alongside or instead of Member States” 
(Vogler 2005; Stokke/Thommessen 2003) participation in UNEP remains under-
researched.  
 
To sum up, EU activity in UNEP has not been explored to the degree that EU and 
environmental governance has, independently, by legal (Bodansky 1999) and social 
scientists (Jupille/Caporaso 1998). The EU’s legal status being limited to an 
“observer” has not posed as many impediments as one would expect. The EU, as 
seen above, has been a signatory alongside its Member States on various 
environmental conventions (mixed agreements) and has also had the opportunity to 
be represented in the fora, albeit with no voting power. The mixed legal 
competences in conjunction with EU and national environmental objectives of its e 
Member States on many occasions however has yielded obstacles for the EU at the 
                                                 
113 See E/CN.6/2000/PC/L.1/Rev.2 Streamline outcome document pp.16-17. 
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internal level in its coordination efforts and at the external level in its recognition by 
‘outsiders’. “In international environmental diplomacy it exhibits a number of peculiar 
and chameleon-like traits that distinguish the way that the Union appears to the 
outside world” (Vogler 2005: 849). The established bilateral relationship between 
UNEP and the EU through its lens of opportunities for “synergy and cooperation”114 
has created a stepping stone for the EU to further its treaty objectives while 
achieving its strategic objectives in the international environmental fora. Further 
studies focusing specifically on EU and UNEP however are still required for a more 
comprehensive understanding of its actual role and, ultimately, position.  
 
3.3  Summarizing the findings: the practical virtues of the 
interdisciplinary framework of analysis 
 
The three illustrative cases exemplify EU activity via its three awarded legal statuses 
in the UN system to demonstrate the linkages between the formal guidelines of the 
given UN body to that of how the EU is actually participating in practice.  
 
The application of the proposed interdisciplinary approach of EU activity in UN 
bodies less frequently covered in literature has yielded some useful insights both on 
the utility of the chosen approach and in terms of substance. While content was not 
our main concern here - and as no substantial empirical research was carried out by 
ourselves - the core finding that can be retrieved from the cursory overviews of the 
three examples is that the legal status granted to the EU in these multilateral bodies 
is in itself not a very good indicator of its real degree of activity, influence, position, 
or, in other terms, of its ‘role’, even though the term itself remains underspecified. In 
the FAO, it seems that the EU plays a less prominent part despite a legal status that 
puts it on equal footing with other members, i.e. states. On the contrary, in the 
WSSD, the enhanced legal status has seemingly helped the EU make important 
contributions and play an active role. Finally, in UNEP, where the EU has the least 
amount of formal rights, it is one of the core financial contributors. This has, 
however, not yet translated into a considerable degree of influence.  
 
Concerning the approach itself, it could be discerned that interdisciplinary research 
on the topic of EU participation in multilateral fora is workable in practice and, 
moreover, leads to observations that would probably go unnoticed when working 
with mono-disciplinary approaches. To highlight just a few examples from the 
discussed cases, while the assumption in political science that full membership rights 
                                                 
114 See June 2005 European Council Conclusions. 
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help the EU to play an important part in the FAO suggests itself, a thorough analysis 
of the legal status of the EU in this body reveals rights but also limitations which may 
help understand why actual EU activity falls short of these expectations. On the other 
hand, a purely mono-disciplinary legal approach would overlook the nature of EU 
activity and influences on international structures, for example in the WSSD. Purely 
looking at EU competence in sustainable development and the rules of procedure of 
the Summit, more specifically regulations of interventions, would only cede to 
demonstrating formal capabilities and not the means of how the EU is addressing the 
issues at hand nor how their interventions are being perceived by the international 
community. 
 
As it may be observed in the discussed examples, there is a significant lack of 
empirical research on some of the categories and bodies, which as a result has 
hampered a complete understanding of these instances of EU participation in the UN 
system. While this observation only confirms previous findings identifying significant 
research gaps, it adds some more shortcomings to the list: for the FAO, while a lot 
has been written by legal scholars, mostly due to the exceptional full membership 
status, less can be found on this institution in political science. For issues concerning 
sustainable development, a greater number of empirical studies exist, but a lot less 
academic literature specifically on the Summit can be found in legal science. 
Moreover, once again it seems that certain categories of EU activity such as internal 
coordination or recognition by others remain generally under-researched. Hence, the 
proposed approach also has the advantage of attracting attention to areas that 
require more research. 
 
As a result, the essential virtue of the interdisciplinary approach can be seen in the 
fact that it helps to get to a ‘completer’ picture by means of ‘thick description’ and 
thus to advance our understanding of EU activity in a specific body. The four 
categories recognition, governance processes, capacity and objectives, and their 
respective sub-categories provide for a comprehensive analytical framework 
integrating legal and political science concepts while taking both the EU and the 
international level into account. Employing this set of categories to various instances 
of EU participation in the UN and other multilateral fora furthermore allows for 
consistent cross-case comparisons. For these reasons, the proposed analytical 
framework - as it stands - may be regarded as a valuable descriptive tool.  
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Turning to the shortcomings of the proposed approach, it could be seen that some of 
the (sub-) categories, such as ‘strategic objectives’ remain underspecified. This is 
also true for the ‘role’ concept, which currently only allows for an approximative 
assessment of empirical realities. If the proposed approach is to be used as not only 
an analytical framework for descriptive purposes, i.e. to map the EU’s activity in a 
specific multilateral body, but as a foundation for more explanatory accounts, these 
deficits would have to be tackled by further developing some of the categories either 
conceptually or theoretically. This can be done in a variety of ways. A few proposals 
for this will be presented in the following section.  
 
In sum, if these flaws are adequately dealt with, the proposed framework of analysis 
can serve as a useful tool for understanding and evaluating the EU’s substantial 
contributions to multilateral governance. In contrast to the exploratory work 
presented in this section, parting from desk research and, thus, existing literature 
from different fields, truly interdisciplinary studies making use of the (entire or 
elements of the) proposed analytical framework would have to be planned as 
interdisciplinary research from the start. This means that they would ideally part from 
a shared cognitive interest by asking research questions that are meaningful to both 
legal scholars and political scientists and to subsequently design and carry out 
research by following a joint research trajectory. A range of proposals of how legal 
and political science scholars can carry out interdisciplinary research of this type on 
the EU and multilateral governance will be made in the next section. 
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4.  TOWARDS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH AGENDA ON THE EU 
AND MULTILATERAL GOVERNANCE 
  
The exercise of contrasting the three different perspectives (legal, political science 
and interdisciplinary) on the EU’s role in multilateral governance has yielded a great 
number of insights about what is already known about the subject, but also about 
‘research gaps’ and the deficits of current research practice. Above all, it has 
demonstrated that there is ample space for fresh approaches towards the study of 
this subject. The following section is meant to take up this challenge by mapping out 
elements of an interdisciplinary research agenda on a topic that can be expected to 
further gain in practical relevance over the coming years.  
 
From the review of the relevant literature, but also from simply employing the 
archetypical approaches each discipline uses to analyse the EU’s role in multilateral 
fora, two things have become apparent, which may not be so evident at first sight: 
substantially, legal scholars and political scientists often care about similar, 
sometimes even identical sub-topics within the broader subject of EU multilateral 
activity - but, secondly, they employ different terminologies, work with diverging foci 
of attention and make use of different analytical tools.  
In this section, the intention is thus to, firstly, specify some of the most significant 
shared concerns, as they constitute the foundations for joint research of the two 
disciplines. Building on these, a number of tentative research questions about the 
EU’s role - via its legal foundation - in multilateral governance, meant to be tackled 
by both disciplines, will be formulated. Finally, some possible ways of researching 
these questions, building on the outlined interdisciplinary framework of analysis, will 
be presented. This will be supplemented by references to some of the 
underresearched issues regarding EU activity in multilateral governance.  
 
The works of legal scholars and political scientists concerning the EU’s role in 
multilateral governance can broadly be distinguished according to their purposes. 
They fall into three categories: understanding, explaining and improving. Three 
broad fields of shared research interests can be singled out for each of these 
categories.  
Both legal scholars and political scientists have extensively worked descriptively, 
focusing on monitoring and mapping, and thus on attempts at understanding how 
multilateral fora function in the presence of the EU. Within the corpus of these 
descriptive accounts comparable research interests have emerged despite the use 
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of different terminology. From what has been discussed so far, three core interests 
stand out, which translate into a number of questions:  
1.  An interest in understanding institutional frameworks, i.e. the formal legal 
foundations and the informal arrangements that exist at the international and the 
European level. Common research questions within this category can be 
formulated: How can the EU participate in bodies with restricted membership? 
What are the legal and institutional frameworks of the multilateral body x? What 
are the relevant institutional configurations within the EU for its participation in 
body y, on issue z (internal coordination)? 
2. A common attraction to the study of processes on both levels and to the type of 
dynamics at work at the interplay between the two. This interest is centred on the 
investigation into formal and informal negotiation or decision-making processes 
within the international body or within the EU. Interesting research questions are 
thus: How do multilateral negotiations function in UN body x? How does the EU 
take decisions in preparation for its participation in multilateral negotiations in 
forum y (internal coordination)? Which negotiation styles (arguing, bargaining, 
deliberating) dominate, which instruments are used in each of these arenas? 
How does the negotiation style affect outcomes of the negotiation process (hard 
law, soft law) and, vice-versa, how does the proposed outcome affect negotiation 
position and styles? How do the two negotiation arenas (EU internal and 
international level) link up?  
3. A concern with agency that is reflected in concepts such as ‘recognition’. The 
prime agent under examination is obviously the EU and its sub-structures. Third 
countries, the multilateral body itself or non-state entities and their behaviour vis-
à-vis the EU may be other relevant agents to analyse. Questions to be asked 
are, e.g.: How does EU commitment to multilateralism show - legally and 
politically - in forum f, on topic t? How does EU representation in body b on issue 
a function? Who, on the EU side, is the point of contact when ‘mixed’ agreements 
are tabled for discussion? How does country y perceive the EU´s participation in 
body z? (external recognition) What are the capacities and margins of 
manoeuvre of the EU, of EU Member States, of third country c,d,e in a given 
multilateral forum? How do EU negotiators and EU Member States coordinate 
under varying degrees of legal obligation to do so? 
Many questions formulated for descriptive purposes will be cutting across the three 
fields of shared interest.  
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Secondly, and building largely on this exercise of understanding, both legal scholars 
and political scientists have tried to unveil the logics of the EU’s system-wide 
activities, by, e.g., identifying trends or extracting patterns of EU activities across 
multilateral fora. In the face of the illustrated diversity of the EU’s activities in various 
arenas, this has, so far, not led to many results. The shared interest in generalizing, 
and, hence, explaining the EU’s role in multilateral fora has translated into some 
concrete common research concerns that can be subsumed under the same three 
headings. Some exemplary research questions are stated under each:  
1. A shared interest in explaining the institutional frameworks that can be 
observed at the international and the EU level: Why has a specific set of 
institutions emerged to deal with issue x? How and why has the EU been granted 
a specific legal status in forum y? What are the consequences of EU multilateral 
activity at the national, regional and international level? 
2. A common concern with the processes of multilateral governance itself and of 
the organisation of preparatory work for this inside the EU: Why has a certain 
negotiation style emerged in forum x and what is the contribution of the EU to 
this? Why are certain instruments preferred over others in the decision-making 
process in multilateral body y? 
3. Agency: An interest in accounting - inter alia - for the evolving legal statuses and 
roles of the actor EU and its performance in multilateral governance: Why has 
the EU committed itself strongly to multilateralism? Why has the EU in some 
cases been recognized as a unitary/powerful actor and not in others? (external 
recognition) Why has the EU in some cases been successful in pushing its policy 
objectives through and not in others? Why does EU 
coordination/representation/participation in multilateral governance take so many 
different forms in different fora and why does it take these exact forms?  
 
Thirdly, a research trajectory which has received less consideration in this article but 
has attracted both legal scholars’ and political scientists’ attention is normative 
thinking on the question of the democratic legitimacy of multilateral governance, i.e. 
on how to improve the effectiveness of governance and enhance the participation 
of all kinds of actors in multilateral fora (Scharpf 1999). Once again, three categories 
of shared interests may be distinguished, each of which comes with some important 
normative questions:  
1.   A shared interest in improving the institutional frameworks that have emerged 
at the international and the EU level: How can and should the legitimacy 
(effectiveness/participation) of multilateral governance be enhanced? How 
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should future multilateral arrangements be framed to better accommodate 
regional organisations? Which existing multilateral bodies should amend their 
founding constitutions to ensure full participation and rights of regional integration 
organizations? 
2.   A shared concern of ameliorating the processes of negotiations, decision-
making and implementation in multilateral governance: How should procedures 
be improved to enable broader participation of various (non-state) actors at 
various stages of the negotiation processes? Should mechanisms be created to 
enable better parliamentary control of decision of multilateral fora? Should 
procedures within the EU be made more transparent to enable better control of 
EU multilateral activity via national and/or the European parliament(s)? How 
should the clarification of division of powers between the Union and its Member 
States take form and could that be made a precondition to joining an international 
organisation? 
3.   Agency: An interest in making the EU become a ‘better’ player in multilateral 
fora, i.e. changing the actor to enhance the efficiency of multilateral governance: 
How should the EU act in multilateral fora to enhance the legitimacy of 
multilateral governance and its own legitimacy as a foreign policy actor?  How 
could and should the EU assume more international responsibility? 
 
In sum, a range of topics of shared interest exist, which can be translated into an 
even greater number of related research questions that engage both legal and 
political science, only some of which have been emphasised here. The outlined 
agenda can be flexibly applied, adapted and combined with the framework of 
analysis presented in the previous section to come to related research questions on 
diverse topics and bodies: How does the EU coordinate for the discussions on food 
safety in the FAO? Is there a pattern? Why has this particular way of doing it 
emerged? What is the role of legal and political factors in this development? How 
can and should this be improved?  
 
If interdisciplinarity is taken as a condition sine qua non for research on this topic, the 
remaining task is now to conceive research designs that can provide answers to 
such research questions while serving as practical guidelines capable of integrating 
both legal and political science methodology. This does not imply developing a “joint 
discipline” (Slaughter Burley 1993) but rather using the strengths of each of the 
disciplines and their respective tool-kits to construct integrated research itineraries. 
While the development of the analytical framework presented in the previous section 
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has largely been inspired by concepts employed in legal science, empirical social 
sciences and their tried and tested set of research methods constitute the prime 
source of inspiration when it comes to building research designs.  
In general terms, in any type of research on this topic, it would first and foremost be 
desirable to achieve a greater degree of cohesion, which implies employing a 
coherent terminology and making use of established concepts either by directly 
replicating them or by systematically making reference to them. While 
acknowledging that this degree of coherence has not even been achieved within the 
disciplines - and while promoting a pragmatic approach such as the one presented 
here as a first step -, we do think that it would be largely beneficial to strive for a 
minimum of consistent cross-referencing when pushing the frontier in a fairly new 
field of study.115  
 
More concretely, a first distinction needs to be made between descriptive and 
explanatory research, typically working with empirical methods, on the one, and 
normative research on the other hand. As for the former two, three promising 
research trajectories can be identified. A tentative research conception that can be 
utilised is the single case study design (Yin 2003): The broad range of diversity 
that has been observed concerning the EU’s participation in multilateral governance 
represents a strong case for comprehensive and detailed analyses of single issues 
or ‘cases’. This research strategy is above all targeted at advancing the 
understanding of the subject, but can also be explanatory in nature. It could be used 
to answer questions on the EU’s internal coordination for its work in a UN body, for 
instance, or for the explication of the conditions for success of the EU’s activities in a 
specific multilateral forum. Legal and political science elements of analysis can easily 
be integrated into a case study design, e.g., by using a conceptual framework such 
as the one presented in the previous section. In practical terms, when conducting 
this research, legal analysis would be combined with the use of empirical methods 
such as qualitative interviewing (Kvale 1996).  
Secondly, a comparative research strategy may be chosen. On the one hand, this 
can take the form of multiple, issue-based case studies examining the EU’s 
performance in various fora, whose results would then be cross-checked against 
each other (Yin 2003). Such research can certainly advance the understanding of 
EU multilateral activity. It may also contribute towards building explanatory 
statements. For this type of research, it would be interesting to make use of a single 
                                                 
115 As noted in the introduction, a first task would probably be to further specify the term ‘multilateral 
governance’ itself by making it more operational so that legal scholars will feel more inclined to 
employ it. 
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analytical framework - such as the one presented earlier, or some specific elements 
of it - and examine, for example, very similar or very different cases (Lijphart 1971). 
On the other hand, comparative studies can take the form of regional comparison, 
i.e. contrasting the actor EU to other actors such as the United States (Jørgensen 
2006: 196) - by building, for instance, on the range of studies that exists on the US 
and multilateralism (Patrick/Forman 2002) - or to other regional integration projects 
such as Mercosur. Here, one should however beware of getting caught in the 
‘analogy trap’ (Messner 2003). Comparative research strategies could be used to 
examine all types of ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions outlined above. Legal and empirical 
analyses could once again be serviceably combined.  
A third type of research design that promises manifold insights for both descriptive 
and explanatory research are longitudinal studies, which are typically employed to 
analyse trends or patterns unfolding over time. Such designs could be chosen, for 
instance, to explore the evolution of legal statuses the EU may have held in a 
specific forum and how these translate(d) into different forms of actual activity or 
degrees of influence at various points in time. Depending on the purpose of the 
research, longitudinal studies can take the form of descriptive chronologies or can be 
designed as ‘process-tracing’ exercises (Bennett/George 2005) to build explanatory 
statements. All of the questions outlined above can thus be tackled with this type of 
research design. Moreover, legal and empirical perspectives really go hand in hand 
here, since the evolving legal framework conditions the developments in political 
reality and vice-versa. A conceptual framework such as the one proposed in this 
article could equally be used for structuring such research, as it provides a clear 
guideline of what to look for at different points in time. 
 
In contrast to research aimed at understanding and explaining, normative research 
relies to a lesser extent on empirical methods. The challenge for interdisciplinary 
normative research is, above all, one of analytically integrating legal and political 
science concepts. This implies combining both legal and political theories of 
legitimacy and developing a fairly coherent terminology. Such interdisciplinary 
research could tackle any of the normative questions outlined above. It only comes 
last on the proposed list of research strategies here because any research aimed at 
improving multilateral governance and the EU’s performance therein should ideally 
pass by at least a thorough understanding of the main features of these. As has 
been illustrated, this condition is quite often not yet fulfilled. 
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In sum, we hope that these research designs can contribute to answering the type of 
questions raised here, as they display the necessary flexibility and openness to 
incorporate an interdisciplinary dimension and leave ample space for the integration 
of various types of theoretical perspectives. Theories have  not played an important 
explicit part in this paper. Nevertheless,  enhancing the explanatory power of the 
concepts presented here by embedding them in theoretical debates will, at some 
point, and depending on the available knowledge on the subject, be advantageous, if 
not necessary, for the proposed interdisciplinary research. Many concepts utilized 
within the framework of analysis presented in this article, especially the ‘role’ 
concept, would greatly benefit from being upgraded theoretically. A necessary 
precondition is that legal scholars have to be prepared to deal with the - sometimes 
confusing - theoretical richness that political science has on offer. Interesting 
discussions of how various types of theoretical approaches could be made fruitful for 
our subject of study have been presented elsewhere (Jørgensen 2006; Jørgensen 
/Oberthür/Shahin 2007). 
 
Finally, as multilateral governance covers such a broad range of issues, the choice 
of cases to study is another point of consideration. No limits are set to the creativity 
and the specific interests of scholars here, but it should be borne in mind that some 
topics such as CFSP and trade issues have already been extensively treated, albeit 
usually not in an interdisciplinary manner. It would therefore be of interest to 
concentrate research efforts more on some under-researched areas in order to get 
to a broader picture of where the EU is active within and beyond the UN system. 
Topics could be chosen from the EU’s involvement in multilateral fora dealing with 
human rights (Human Rights Council, Third Committee, International Criminal Court 
etc.), development issues (UN Development Programme, FAO, IMF, World Bank 
etc.), environmental issues (UNEP, various conferences such as the conferences of 
the parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change etc.), social issues 
(Third Committee, International Labour Organization etc.), but also from less 
prominent cases such as public health governance on food safety (WHO, FAO etc.), 
from the fight against organised crime conducted under the auspices of various 
bodies or from science and technology governance on issues like space policy 
(Group on Earth Observation etc.).  
All in all, the combination of shared research interests, potential common research 
questions and research designs leads to a comprehensive interdisciplinary research 
agenda. An overview of this is provided in Table 3. 
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Table 3: The EU and multilateral governance – towards an interdisciplinary 
research agenda 
1. Some important shared research interests of legal and political science 
and examples of research questions 
 
a. Understanding the EU’s involvement in multilateral governance 
 
Framework:  What are the legal and institutional frameworks of the 
multilateral body x? What are the relevant institutional structures 
within the EU for its participation in body y, on issue z? 
Processes: How do multilateral negotiations function in UN body x? How 
does the EU take decisions in preparation for its participation in 
multilateral negotiations in forum y? How does the negotiation style 
affect outcomes of the negotiation process (hard law, soft law) and, 
vice-versa, how does the proposed outcome affect negotiation 
position and styles?  How do the two negotiation arenas (EU internal 
and international level) link up? 
Agency: How does EU representation in UN body b on issue a function? How 
does country y perceive the EU´s participation in body z? What are 
the capacities and margins of manoeuvre of the EU, of country c,d,e in 
a given multilateral forum? How do EU negotiators and EU Member 
States coordinate under varying degrees of legal obligation to do so? 
 
b. Explaining trends of EU participation in multilateral governance  
 
Framework: Why has a specific set of institutions emerged to deal with 
issue x? Why has the EU been granted a specific legal status in forum 
y? What are the consequences of EU multilateral activity at the 
national, regional and international level? 
Processes: Why has a certain negotiation style emerged in forum x and 
what is the contribution of the EU to this?  
Agency:  Why has the EU in some cases been recognized as a 
(unitary/powerful) actor and not in others? Why has the EU in some 
cases been successful in pushing its policy objectives through and not 
in others? Why does EU coordination/representation/participation in 
multilateral governance take so many different forms in different fora 
and why does it take these exact forms? 
 
c. Improving the democratic legitimacy (effectiveness/participation) of 
multilateral governance & the EU’s contribution to this  
 
Framework:   How can and should the legitimacy 
(effectiveness/participation) of multilateral governance be enhanced? 
How should multilateral arrangements be framed to better 
accommodate regional organisations? 
Processes: How should procedures be improved to enable broader 
participation of various (non-state) actors at various stages in 
negotiation processes? Should procedures within the EU be made 
more transparent to enable better control of the National and/or the 
European Parliament(s)? 
Agency:  How should the EU act in multilateral fora to enhance the legitimacy of 
multilateral governance and its own legitimacy as a foreign policy 
actor? How could and should the EU assume more international 
responsibility? 
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2.  Possible pathways for interdisciplinary research: Some tentative 
research designs 
 
a. Empirical research 
i.  Single case studies 
ii. Comparative studies 
  (1) multiple case studies 
  (2) regional comparison, e.g. EU with U.S./Mercosur etc.  
iii. Longitudinal studies (chronologies, process-tracing) 
 
b. Normative research  
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 5.   CONCLUSION  
 
As a fairly recent phenomenon, the EU’s increasing participation in multilateral 
governance has so far been studied by both legal and political science and their 
respective sub-disciplines primarily from the perspective of their clearly de-limited 
field of study, producing top down (International Law) and bottom up (EU Law) legal 
analyses, and top down (IR) and bottom up (integration studies/ EU foreign policy 
analysis) political science accounts. The narrow foci of the resulting specialized 
bodies of literature have stood in the way of more integrative studies and have 
ultimately led to regrettable ‘blind spots’ in the research on this topic. Hence, ample 
room for alternative ways of approaching the subject exist.  
 
One possible alternative can be seen in the combination of existing approaches, 
producing synergies by providing more holistic accounts and thus helping to 
eliminate the ‘blind spots’ mono-disciplinary research has left. In an attempt at 
integrating the research acquis of all four sub-disciplines affected, such an 
interdisciplinary framework of analysis has been brought forward and tried out on 
three case examples to evaluate its practicability.  
This exercise has demonstrated that interdisciplinary research is both feasible and 
beneficial. It is feasible because, as the case illustrations have shown, it can build on 
common research interests of legal and political science scholars. The approaches 
taken by the two disciplines, despite the persistence of different terminologies, often 
really represent the two sides of the same coin. Secondly, joint research can be 
considered as beneficial to each discipline individually and for the understanding of 
the topic on the whole. For legal scholars, an opening towards political science 
terminology, empirical methodology and, possibly, theory may provide for a whole 
new tool-kit that could enable them to carry out more systematic studies to gain 
greater insights into political reality. On the other hand, political scientists could 
benefit from the greater clarity of legal foundations and guiding principles vis-à-vis 
case law, and specifically inspire themselves by the precision of terminology which is 
characteristic of the legal method. 
 
Together, both disciplines may carry out analyses that yield more and different 
insights than mono-disciplinary research on the EU’s position in multilateral 
governance because they provide a wholly new perspective. This type of ‘holistic’ 
research represents not only a value added for legal and political science, but may 
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also be of interest to practitioners in the EU and elsewhere, who, in their daily lives 
‘on the job’ are confronted with problems situated on the cusp between the legal and 
the political spheres and do not possess the option of reducing complexity by 
analytically separating the two. 
In addition to exposing common research interests of legal and political science 
scholars, the testing out of the framework has also revealed some additional 
research gaps. These gaps and the shared research concerns have been taken up 
to outline elements of an interdisciplinary research agenda, including desiderata, 
tentative research questions and potential joint research itineraries.   
 
As the world evolves, and problems calling for collective solutions on the global level 
proliferate, activities falling under the definition of ‘multilateral governance’ become 
increasingly important. Furthermore, if the current trends are set forth, and nothing 
indicates that they should not, the EU will continue to develop as an actor in a 
growing number of multilateral fora. For academia, this means that the number of 
cases to study will keep on growing, augmenting also the need for a better 
understanding, explanation and of an improvement of these real-life phenomena.  
In the face of these developments, interdisciplinary research on the border between 
legal and political science can be considered a key strategy when trying to keep up 
with the evolution of ever more complex global governance architectures. The 
analytical framework presented here constitutes a first, pre-theoretical attempt at 
constructing a workable tool for common research itineraries. Its greatest asset may 
be seen in its openness. It may be used flexibly for analyses of the EU in any type of 
multilateral forum, within and beyond the UN system – and may, if adapted, also be 
useful in the analysis of the EU’s bilateral relations with third countries, other regional 
or international organizations. Furthermore, with slight adjustments, it could be 
imagined to analyse the performances of other regional actors, such as Mercosur, in 
multilateral governance with the help of the categories presented.  
 
If anything, we hope that the presentation of this framework will stimulate a debate 
between legal and political science scholars on the desirability and the possibilities of 
constructing and conducting joint research on this highly pertinent topic.  
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